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CRIME, THE PUBLIC, AND THE CRIME 
COMMISSION: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 
IN A FREE SOCIETY 
Warren Lehman* 
Robert Warshaw noted that "So much of official American culture 
has been cheaply optimistic that we are likely almost by reflex to 
take pessimism as a measure of seriousness." It is just this unthinking 
encouragement of bloated expectation that leads young persons to 
compare forecast with outcome and to conclude that hypocrisy and 
duplicity are at work. What is asked of us is honesty; and what that 
requires is a great deal more rigor in matching our performance to 
our standards. It is now the only way to maintain the credibility of 
those standards. 
Daniel P. Moynihan*"' 
I. GOVERNMENT BY COMMISSION 
W HAT is the appropriate set for the mind when it mulls the report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of J ustice?1 Should it be fine grind, as is the 
professor's when he asks a student in his first class in law school 
to state the case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens?2 Or should the 
running wheel be raised from the bedstone, as is so often the case 
when the professor turns to review the work of a colleague? While 
the latter may have the appeal of habit, there are, I think, three im-
portant reasons why one should not extend to this report the cour-
tesies academe usually offers an individual author. 
First there is the office that any commission report has to fulfill. 
Such a report is intended to influence the policy decisions of govern-
ments, and it is supposed to do so directly, without the mediation of 
critics. It is not an entry in the intellectual market place, where pre-
sumably error will be discovered by failure to sell. Rather, it is im-
plied that error has been eliminated from the report by pretesting 
among the commissioners and their staff, and that further discussion 
is therefore unnecessary. 
Just how direct this impact on policy is supposed to be is evi-
• Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University (St. Louis), A.B. 1950, J.D. 
1964, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
•• Nirvana Now, ll6 THE AM. SCHOLAR 5ll9, 548 (1967). 
1. PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N ON I.Aw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CR1ME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter REPORT]. 
2. 14 Q.B.D. 27ll (1884). 
[ 1487] 
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deuced by the President's treatment of his Crime Commission report. 
Some of the recommendations were embodied as legislative proposals 
in a presidential message to Congress before the report was made 
public.3 Moreover, the intent to protect the work from critical exam-
ination-which would reduce its political effectiveness-is demon-
strated by the report's own advertising. The panegyric with which 
the Commission introduces itself and its work to the public would 
embarrass the publisher of memory-improvement books. I quote at 
length despite a strong predisposition not to interrupt myself with 
the words of others: 
The report is the work of 19 commissioners, 63 staff members, 175 
consultants, and hundreds of advisers. The commissioners, staff, con-
sultants, and advisers come from every part of America and represent 
a broad range of opinion and profession. 
In the process of developing the findings and recommendations 
of the report the Commission called three national conferences, con-
ducted five national surveys, held hundreds of meetings, and inter-
viewed tens of thousands of persons. 
The report makes more than 200 specific recommendations-con-
crete steps the Commission believes can lead to a safer and more just 
society.4 
The reviewer by tempering his judgments-by pointing up the 
good and ignoring the bad or by admiring the effort as he might for 
the individual work of a colleague-unwittingly furthers the impres-
sion that the work is beyond question, and thereby does a disservice 
to the community. Obviously, no matter what the credentials of its 
author, a ·writing by which the sovereign is guided deserves much 
closer scrutiny than the one in which an individual seeks to persuade 
the mind of the public. To overlook, out of misplaced kindliness or 
for unstated political reasons, the erroneous, even the merely argu-
able, in authoritative proposals for government activity is an in-
tellectual sin. 
A second reason for a less than charitable approach is the possi-
bility that the President's Commission on Crime and the Adminis-
tration of Justice just might be a typical presidential commission. It 
has been suggested that "government by commission" may represent 
a late and promising development in the governance of democratic 
societies. 5 The argument is that in most western countries the power 
3. Crime in America: The President's Message to Congress Recommending Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Legislation for the Control of Narcotics, Firearms, and 
Wiretapping (delivered Feb. 6, 1967), 3 "WEEKLY CO?,{PILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL Docu-
MENTS 182 (Feb. 13, 1967), 113 CONG. REc. 985 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1967). 
4. REPORT at V. 
5. Bell, Government by Commission, THE Ptra. INTEREST, Spring 1966, at 3, 6-9. 
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to initiate legislation has slipped from the grasp of legislators and 
been taken up by national executives. The threat of such a develop-
ment has been given many names-Boulanism, Gaullism, the cult 
of personality. The question posed when political power is centered 
in the executive is how, other than by removal of the executive, 6 
shall public opinion influence policy. Without at least some oppor-
tunity for initiative from the citizenry one can hardly call one's gov-
ernment a democracy. Daniel Bell (following de J ouvenal) has sug-
gested that the commission may solve this problem by bringing to 
the executive the views of the people.7 
The report of the Crime Commission calls into question Bell's 
optimism, for that report reflects not the mind of the community but 
that of the Administration. A Presidential commission ( one is 
tempted to generalize) is a pride of domesticated intellectuals and 
leading citizens willing to sacrifice their disagreements in hope of 
drinking at the springs of power. This hope is a snare and a delusion: 
the commissarial lions jump to the whip of the politician. And it is 
the lion-tamer whose reputation is enhanced by the lions, not vice 
versa. 
A commission does more to enhance executive power than to 
subject it to neodemocratic restraint. A commission report lends to 
a President's legislative proposals whatever authority the commis-
sioners have. Moreover, a commission as a source of legislative 
initiative has a tactical advantage over a legislature. The commission 
can provide a complete legislative package. The legislature, by con-
trast, has too much on its mind to devote eighteen months to a 
wide-ranging examination of large topics; it lacks the staff that 
can be provided a presidential commission; and, because its mem-
bers' positions on many issues will have to be part of the public 
record, a legislature's program is likely to be limited to those items 
upon which individual legislators dare publicly agree. (The Commis-
sion members did their work behind closed doors to avoid exactly 
that problem.)8 The completeness of a commission package enhances 
the attractiveness of each of its components, and the whole is, there-
6. This route is open in any society, though its accomplishment may be more or 
less difficult. Where deposing the sovereign is the only route open, the public cannot 
talk but only scream. Insofar as only the most gross improprieties are reachable 
through deposition, that process bears some similarity to the constitutional limitations 
on the legislature exercised by courts under the rubric of substantive due process. 
See E. FREUND, STANDARDS AMERICAN LEc1sLATION 274 (Phoenix ed. 1965). 
7. See Bell, supra note 5, at 9. 
8. "(S]ecrecy has served ••• a ••• need ••. for consensus among individuals each 
of whom represents a constituency in American public life." MacKenzie, The Com-
promise Report on Crime, NEW R.EPtrauc, Feb. 4, 1967, at 15. 
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fore, greater than the sum of its parts. Finally, a legislator cannot 
afford to ignore the support that the President builds for himself, 
through the publicity that attends his commission's reports, among 
the legislator's own constituents. 
The additional legislative influence that a commission report gives 
to the President might be tolerable if the report were either an inde-
pendent and comprehensive intellectual effort or a reflection of the 
concerns of the community. In fact the Crime Commission report 
was at least as much a report of the President to the people as it was 
a report of the commissioners to the President. And even so far as it 
was the report of the commissioners, it gave voice not to the opinions 
of the people but rather to political compromises between the crim-
inal justice establishment and what Daniel Moynihan might call 
doctrinaire liberalism.9 Qames Q. Wilson began his review of the 
Commission report by pointing out that it was not organized to an-
swer the questions an intelligent layman would want to discuss; 
rather, it was organized "around the existing institutional machinery 
for handling criminals.")10 If the President can significantly influence 
the content of a commission report, and if the report is also the result 
of closed-door political compromises, it is doubtful that the commis-
sion format provides an acceptable solution to the perceived problem 
of bringing public opinion to bear upon government. 
If our first reason for refusing the report's claim of special respect 
is because of what it is intended to accomplish (we may well have to 
live by its suggestions), our third reason for denying it that respect 
is because of what the report is. If the report is a narrowly political 
document, it is an inappropriate device for determining long-range 
policy issues. It is hard to imagine anything more inappropriate than 
allowing such policy decisions to be made, without criticism, by those 
closely bound to the politics of the present. The future ought not be 
defined by what is politically possible now. It is equally hard to 
imagine that policy proposals made by those restricted by the poli-
tics of the present are not peculiarly susceptible to error-error in 
description of the problems of both the present and future, and 
hence in the solutions suggested. At the very least we should not 
9. Moynihan, Nirvana Now, 36 THE AM. SCHOLAR 539 (1967). 
10. Wilson, A Reader's Guide to the Crime Commission Reports, THE PUB. INTER• 
EST, Fall 1967, at 64, 64-65. Wilson in this and an earlier article (published before 
the Commission Report), Crime in the Streets, THE PuB. INTEREST, Fall 1966, at 26, 
has contributed much to my understanding. I owe him especially profuse thanks for 
this gift as I am guilty of having, on the basis of an incorrect quotation, made some 
nasty cracks about him in Thinking Small About Urban Renewal, 1965 WASHINGTON 
U.L.Q. 396-97. He was kind enough to point out my error with humor rather than 
rancor. 
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allow the authors of a report so suspect in origin to rush us into 
action, and yet that is exactly what they would do. 
The rush is betrayed by the framework of the report. In the most 
general terms, the argument of the report is that the problem of 
crime in America has reached crisis proportions11 but that we can be 
optimistic about solving that problem if only we carry out the Com-
mission's specific recommendations.12 Both of these propositions, at 
least as they will be understood by most readers, are false. Neither 
are we so badly off as the Commission implies, nor are we justified 
in any optimism that things will get measurably better in the next 
twenty years. The dramatics are peddled to us so that we may eagerly 
and unquestioningly support the Commission's conclusions and its 
recommendations. 
Yet, a presidential commission could indeed provide a most use-
ful service, especially when its subject matter is one about which the 
public is both anxious and ill-informed. In such circumstances the 
commission has the chance to replace phantasms with information, 
to replace worry with thought, and to give direction to an inchoate 
desire to act. The opportunity is a precious one, for a commission is 
in a unique position to reach not only those specialists for whom its 
subject matter is of daily concern but also the whole of the literate 
public. No individual scholar can hope to attract a hundredth part 
of the circulation, a hundredth part of the press coverage, but such 
attention is the commission's by right. The opportunity is precious 
not only because the whole of the public will be reached, but because 
the same subject will not in a generation be considered under the 
same circumstances again. If the subject has not been exhausted, po-
tential authors will have been, and so will the patience and purse of 
the community. 
The duty of a commission is commensurate with the uniqueness 
of its opportunity and with its unparalleled power to affect legisla-
tures and the mind of the public. Measured by its duty, the Crime 
Commission was a failure. 
It was not a failure because of its inability to find the answers to 
admittedly hard questions. If anything, it failed because it pretended 
to have answers. It failed because to a public seeking guidance it dis-
simulated, equivocated, and avoided. It failed because, withal, it pos-
tured as a revolutionary committee. Likely, it seems, the failure was 
inevitable for a modem political commission. I provide something 
ll. "The criminal justice system is faced with too urgent a need for action to stand 
back for a generation and engage in research." REPORT ll!. 
12. REPORT at vi. 
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of a history that others may judge whether this failure was an acci-
dent or an inevitability. 
II. THE TRANSMUTATION OF GOLDWATERISM 
A single startling event appears to have begun the process by 
which a formless public concern about crime was played upon, 
molded, and remolded to suit the needs of politicians. The authors 
of the report were only the most recent to get on the bandwagon-
to take advantage of crime having become a national issue. 
In New York City early in the morning of March 13, 1964, Win-
ston Mosley murdered Kitty Genovese. To accomplish the murder, 
Mosely made three separate attacks with a knife over a period of 
half an hour. Thirty-eight people were wakened by the victim's 
screaming. A light flickered on, a shout from a window served to 
interrupt the killer, but no one seriously raised a hand to stop the 
mayhem or even to call the police, until, after the third attack, Miss 
Genovese was dead.13 The event received only the most routine atten-
tion from the press14 until the police discovered how many people 
had seen the crime committed but done nothing. A comment from 
the dismayed police commissioner to the city editor of the New York 
Times led to a page-one story on March 27, two weeks after the 
event.15 
The story of the thirty-eight frightened or apathetic witnesses 
made headlines across the country and occasioned a spate of editorial 
self-examination of which the Times' What Kind of People Are 
We?16 was probably typical. Religious leaders, psychologists, and so-
ciologists were asked to analyze the problem.17 We were concerned 
because the thirty-eight people were ourselves, able to look passively 
on while a woman was murdered. So discomfited were some that they 
rose to attack the police or to call for penal legislation for silent wit-
nesses.18 But the basic theme was self-examination. 
That examination continued into July, until the eve of the Re-
publican National Convention. The weekend before the convention, 
publication of a book on the Genovese murder was announced in 
13. See Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call Police, N.Y. Times, March 27, 
1964, at 1, col. 4. The article is reprinted, with additional matter, in A. ROSENTHAL, 
THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES 29-45 (1964). 
14. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 14, 1964, at 26, col. 4. 
15. See A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 13, at 19-25. 
16. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1964, at 18, col. 2. 
17. E.g., Mohr, Apathy Is Puzzle in Queens Killing, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1964, 
at 21, col. 1. 
18. See A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 13, at 53-57, 68-70. 
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the Times.19 A few weeks before, the murderer had been condemned 
to death before cheering spectators.20 
One cannot but believe that the Genovese murder had affected 
Dwight Eisenhower as much as it had the rest of us. And when it 
came time for him to address the convention, he chose to divert but 
once from his purpose of party peace-making-to discuss individual 
moral responsibility for solving, among other things, the problem of 
crime on the streets: "[I]n the home, in the school and the church is 
a great field where the aggregate influence of dedicated concerns 
among the local citizenry can be applied with revolutionary impact 
on all these evils."21 This response was appropriate to the view that 
the thirty-eight witnesses evidenced a moral decay that could be 
cured only by a reassertion of individual virtue. Moments later, how-
ever, Eisenhower betrayed a sympathy with those New Yorkers who 
had sought to shift the blame from themselves. The convention was 
aroused by the unbecoming statement that we should not be "guilty 
of maudlin sympathy for the [apprehended] criminal, who [had 
been] roaming the streets with switchblade knife ... seeking help-
less prey .... "22 It was that latter remark, not the former, which 
was to set the tone when it came time for Barry Goldwater to offer 
leadership in defining the crime problem for an unhappy public. 
That, perhaps, is not surprising; it was those who cheered the Eisen-
hower remark-the radical conservatives who had gained control of 
the convention-who were to be responsible for Goldwater's nomi-
nation. 
If Eisenhower's individual responsibility theme had been occa-
sioned by the Genovese murder, his crime repression theme, symbol-
ized by the switchblade knife, may well be attributable to the expe-
rience of another New York City girl. Shortly before the convention 
opened, Miss Arlene Del Fava had drawn a switchblade knife from 
her purse and used it to fend off a would-be rapist. The attacker was 
apprehended, but so was Miss Del Fava-for carrying the knife. She 
said that she had done so because she did not "want to be another 
Kitty Genovese."23 Miss Del Fava was finally discharged by a grand 
jury, but not until the day after Eisenhower's address. The Del Fava 
case provided an unfortunate counterpoint to the Genovese case. 
The disgruntled observer, anxious to rid himself of any blame for 
19. The book was A. RoSENTIIAL, supra note 13. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1964, at 33, 
col. 3; Nichols, Book Review, id. July 12, 1964, pt. VII, at 10. 
20. See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1964, at I, col. 6. 
21. Id., July 15, 1964, at 20, col. 8. 
22. Id.; Rovere, Letter From San Francisco, THE NEW YORKER, July 25, 1964, at 77. 
2!1. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1964, at 33, col. 6. 
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Kitty Genovese's death, could easily convince himself either that the 
assumption of individual responsibility was useless or that analyzing 
the crime problem in those terms was irrelevant. It was a convenient 
psychological release, a phony double-blind that restored the sense 
of righteousness. 
Before Eisenhower's address there was no evidence that either 
Goldwater or Republicans in general had any intention of empha-
sizing the problem of crime in the national campaign. Goldwater 
had not attended to the subject previously and it was not being se-
riously considered by the Republican platform committee.24 But in 
a press conference before his acceptance speech, Goldwater, asked 
what he foresaw to be the issues of the campaign, said, "I think ... 
the abuse of law and order in this country is going to be [an] issue-
at least I'm going to make it one because I think the responsibility 
has to start some place." He did not suggest that it should begin with 
the extirpation of the silent witness in ourselves. Instead, he asserted, 
to the surprise of many, that "responsibility should start at the fed-
eral level with Federal courts enforcing the law."25 Then he cited 
as an example of the sorry pass to which we had come the fact that 
a New York girl was being held for carrying the knife with which 
she had defended herself; while, he said, the attacker is probably 
going to get a medal.26 Even after so clear a statement no one seri-
ously believed that Goldwater would make crime a campaign issue.27 
But, of course, he did. 
24. See Rovere, supra note 22, at 77: 
The origin of this commendable but somewhat novel resolve [to solve the prob• 
lem of crime in the streets] is not clear. Goldwater exegetes say that it never has 
been a theme in his earlier writings and speeches. There were intimations of it 
in the platform-talk. of "moral decline and drift" and an indictment of the John-
son administration for "encouraging disorderly and lawless elements"-but a na-
tional remedy for crime is not among the many good things the platform promises. 
Rovere, A Reporter at Large, THE NEW YoRKER, Oct. 3, 1964, at 201, 202: 
For two or three years now, a number of reasonably intelligent people have been 
studying Goldwater and Goldwaterism as intently-and in some cases almost as 
morbidly-as Cotton Mather ever studied the doings of Satan and the manifesta• 
tions of witchcraft. But not even the most assiduous and imaginative of Gold-
waterologists was prepared for the Senator's emergence in San Francisco as a 
candidate for High Sheriff as well as for President. 
25. Rovere, supra note 22, at 77. The quotation is repeated by Rovere in A Re-
porter at Large, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 1964, at 201, 202-03, but the concluding 
phrase, "with federal courts enforcing the law," is dropped. 
26. See N.Y. Times, July 17, 1964, at 11, col. 8. 
27. See Rovere, A Reporter at Large, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 1964, at 201, 202-03: 
Goldwaterologists in the Cow Palace and across the country were stunned [by 
Goldwater's reference to crime in his acceptance]-and stunned again ••• in a 
press conference the following morning [when he made the statement quoted in 
the text] •••. [Goldwater was vague when asked for detail, and] Goldwaterolo-
gists assumed that this was about the size of it-the Republican candidate would 
continue to take a stand against "bullies and marauders" but would not under-
mine his whole position as a strict Constitutionalist by proposing any specific 
strategy of intervention. 
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It seems both more appealing and more reasonable to believe that 
Eisenhower's statements reflected the honest feeling of a concerned 
official rather than that they were a trial balloon the Goldwater 
forces induced him to set free. It is difficult to base a political cam-
paign upon the moral rearmament of the electorate; to be a really 
useful political issue, a public concern must be appropriate for gov-
ernmental action. The mutation in the Eisenhower position implied 
in his switchblade knife remark, Goldwater's assumption of federal 
responsibility-these were the grounds for a political campaign. Yet 
the conjunction was probably an accident-an irresponsible seizing 
upon issues that seemed attractive because they had been so lately 
in the public eye. The day after the convention Goldwater could 
suggest-as a federal function in crime fighting-only his own pro-
spective moral leadership as President.28 His later expansion of the 
possibilities for federal responsibility had the earmarks not of dissim-
ulation and controlled exposure but of discovery. If the choice of 
campaign issues was this kind of accident, Goldwater was blessed 
with the luck of the Princes of Serendip. 
The moral turpitude and apathy themes had been used by the 
platform committee, developed by the press in analyzing the Geno-
vese case, and would appeal to the righteous and simple whom Gold-
water counted among his supporters. More important, the "big city 
crime problem" meant "the Negro problem" to many. There was 
already supposed to be a backlash among moderate whites against 
excesses in the civil rights movement. Goldwater could say, "as the 
President, I am going to do all I can to see that women can go out 
in the streets of this country without being scared stiff";29 his audi-
ence, racist and backlash, could be expected to read "white" before 
"women" and to picture as the threatening aggressor the Negro male 
in all his animal virility. In addition, there was the United States 
Supreme Court which had added coddling criminals to the list of 
sins for which the John Birch Society was anxious to condemn it. 
The crime problem as a political platform provided a simple means 
of courting just those groups whose support Barry Goldwater needed, 
without Goldwater having to wear his-or Robert Welch's-heart 
on his sleeve. The advantages of this approach were missed by nei-
ther the political commentators30 nor Barry Goldwater's own advi-
28. See id. 203. 
29. Quoted in Rovere, supra note 22, at 77. 
30. See id. at 78: 
Before the Convention, [Republican delegates] seemed at a loss for a way to court 
the racist vote in the North without making racism an article of the new Repub-
lican credo. But a way it seems has now been found, and the candidate who says 
he has moral scruples about the principle of segregation seems positively cxhil-
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sors. As election neared, a Republican policy team recommended 
that the campaign issues be narrowed to a few. First on the list was 
moral decay; second was the crime that decay produced. Foreign 
policy issues followed.31 
There was one problem with the crime issue: how could a con-
stitutional fundamentalist square his call for federal leadership in 
crime control with his support of states' rights? How, in fact, could 
anyone transform the need for law and order in the streets into a 
federal problem? Goldwater was vague when he was asked for an 
explanation the day after the convention. "He said a few words 
about creating an improved 'moral climate' by force of presidential 
example, and some about bettering the quality of the federal ju-
diciary."32 A few days later he was more specific: his plan included 
replacing present law enforcement officers with persons who under-
stood that the important thing about law enforcement is to put crim-
inals behind bars; getting Congress to overrule the Mallory rule by 
statute;33 filling the court with appointees who would "redress Con-
stitutional interpretation in favor of the public";34 and supporting a 
constitutional amendment that would "give back to the states those 
powers absolutely needed for fair and efficient administration of 
criminal law."35 
The moral decay, the decay of which the Republican policy com-
mittee had spoken, was not attributed to Goldwater's intended con-
stituency, but to some undefined others-Northerners, city-folk, 
Negroes, teenagers, criminals; the blank could be filled in according 
to the listener's predispositions. And these undefined others were to 
be dealt with by invigorated local and federal law enforcement. The 
concerns aroused by the Genovese murder and reflected in Eisen-
hower's speech had been perverted. It was not now the good who 
had grown weak so much as it was the bad who had grown strong. 
Though it was obvious that Goldwater had struck a responsive 
chord-the public was worried about crime and at least a significant 
segment of it apparently welcomed the opportunity to put the blame 
on others-Lyndon Johnson reacted as the incumbent presidential 
arated by the thought of a campaign against mugging, stabbing, rape, house-
breaking, and other well known interracial activities. By this extraordinary means, 
he can seek the backlash vote without for one moment agreeing-or even, perhaps 
acknowledging to himself-that that is what he is doing. 
31. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1964, at 28, col. I. 
32. Rovere, supra note 27, at 203. 
33. See id. 204. 
34. Id. 
35. Quoted in id. 206. 
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candidate in a happy and prosperous nation.36 It was politically in-
expedient for him to dispute Goldwater's analysis of the crime prob-
lem during the campaign; hence, Goldwater's was the only voice 
attempting to define for the public the way in which the crime prob-
lem should be viewed. Johnson's only response was to scoff at the 
notion that crime was a problem for the federal government's con-
cern. When he was asked about the crime issue after the Republican 
convention, Johnson said, "Well, I think I should remind all of you 
that the United States is one of the few nations which does not have 
a national police force. The Constitution provides that responsibility 
for law and order should be vested in the states . . . ."37 By late 
September, however, it was obvious that the crime issue was disturb-
ing him, for he described federal antipoverty and education programs 
as evidence of the Administration's concern with crime.38 By impli-
cation, activities such as those, which might affect the causes of crime, 
defined the proper limits of federal activity in crime control. 
Goldwater's promise to do something about the problem of crime 
in the streets was the most successful of his campaign appeals. Within 
four months of Goldwater's crushing defeat at the polls, Johnson, 
now a President elected on his own, sent a message to Congress in 
which he called crime "a malignant enemy in America's midst" and 
proposed to deal with it as a national problem.39 That Johnson 
adopted the Goldwater theme to his own ends was no accident. His 
doing so undercut a Republican monopoly of the crime question,40 
moved toward a reconciliation with at least the moderate among 
those who voted for Goldwater, and directed his own considerable 
energies to what many believed was a problem of crisis proportions. 
However, grabbing the Goldwater banner was not an easy thing for 
36. Id. at 217, and especially 225-26. 
37. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1964, at 56, col. 5. 
38. See id., Sept. 25, 1964, at 81, col. 5. 
39. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, 21 CONGRESSIONAL Q . .ALMANAC 
1394 (1965). 
40. Johnson's political acumen and foresight have proved no less sensitive than one 
has been led to expect. Governor Ronald Reagan of California is already attempting 
to resurrect for the next presidential campaign the problem of crime in the streets. 
Hill, Reagan Says War Is Election Issue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1967, at 25, col. 2. 
The Ballad of George Romney begins: 
The wind atop Mt. Washington is singing Romney's right George Romney's right 
-the spread of crime and violence must cease George Romney's right • • • • 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 21, 1968, at 1-D, col. 2. 
This Article was written last winter. Today, after the Republican Convention, one 
need hardly cite anything for the proposition that crime remains a national political 
issue, It is overshadowed in the debates of the presidential year by more immediately 
pressing international problems, but it remains an issue of obviously intense feelings, 
and which is still viewed as an appropriate and major subject of national political 
concern. 
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a Democratic President to do. He could not concede any of Gold-
water's explanations for the crime problem. He had to support the 
Supreme Court. He could not place the blame for crime on Negroes. 
He could not admit to moral decay either in his Administration or 
in the city dwellers of the Great Society. And he had to invent a 
federal role in criminal justice administration that satisfied the Con-
stitution, the ideology of his liberal supporters, and the need to 
appear actually to be doing something. 
The presidential message in which Johnson announced his intent 
to create a crime commission must be about the dullest political mas-
terpiece on record. It bears the mark of J ohnsonian prose, but it deals 
in one way or another with each of the problems Johnson faced in 
trying to convert Goldwaterism to his own use. The statement begins 
with the non sequitur, almost obscured by verbal legerdemain, that 
because crime is a nationwide problem it is therefore a problem that 
should be dealt with by the federal government.41 The idea of fed-
eral responsibility £or local law enforcement, a notion developed by 
chance and embraced in desperation by Barry Goldwater, ridiculed 
but a few months before by Johnson, had become a major theme of 
the Great Society. There remained two problems: dissociating John-
son from Goldwaterism and deciding just what the federal govern-
ment might do. 
Johnson began his attack on Goldwaterism with the statement 
that "It is not enough to reflect our concern . . . by seeking out 
single answers or simple answers. They do not exist."42 Then he 
dealt with the conservative's simple answers. With respect to Negro 
responsibility, Johnson pointed out both that the disadvantaged 
are less likely to respect the law and that not all crime is committed 
by "those denied equal opportunity."43 The charge of moral decay 
was met with examples of youthful concern and activity in social 
welfare areas. 44 
The problem of the Supreme Court was a little more difficult to 
handle. The President admitted that misunderstanding had existed 
between law enforcement officers "and some courts," then added, 
"We need to think less about taking sides in such controversies and 
more about our common objective: law enforcement which is both 
fair and effective."415 That the balance was to be struck by ignoring 
41. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, supra note 39. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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the controversy became clear only when, later in the message, John-
son directed the Crime Commission (whose creation he was an-
nouncing) to discover "[W]hat steps can be taken to create greater 
understanding by those involved in the administration of justice at 
the state and local level of the efforts of federal courts to ensure 
protection of individual rights."46 In other words, the Commission's 
role was less to consider the merits of the balance toward which the 
Court appeared to be moving than it was to convince the community 
that it could live with the Court's decisions. 
There were, however, two of Goldwater's positions from which 
Johnson did not retreat. He did not challenge the notion that a 
crime crisis existed. Perhaps more important, he did not return to 
the introspective approach to crime, the approach that had gained 
temporary ascendancy following the Genovese murder. Crime, one 
may infer from the report that the Commission produced for 
Johnson, was to be viewed in the more comfortable way-as the 
business of an anti-society from whom the good can and should be 
protected by governmental activity.47 "Almost every recommenda-
tion in [the Crime Commission report] is a recommendation to 
State or local government ... ,"48 and those that are not are recom-
mendations to the federal government. But one commissioner, Miss 
Genevieve Blatt, was disturbed. In her "additional views" Miss 
Blatt said that the report was deficient in neglecting the fact that 
"godlessness [is] a basic cause of crime," and, she added, "religion 
... a basic cure."49 We need not share her religious faith to be 
surprised that the Commission makes so little point of the notion 
that a citizen ought not "shop syndicate." 
III. THE VIRTUE OF UNANIMITY 
Having put Goldwater down, Johnson-if he was to insist there 
was a crime crisis-had now to produce his own program. Consid-
ering his penchant for creating commissions, 50 it is not surprising 
46. Id. at 1396 (emphasis in original). 
47. There are expressions to the contrary in the report, but they usually take the 
form of pious afterthoughts. 
48. REPORT at 279. 
49. REPORT at 302. 
50. "[I]n recent years, the number and variety of Government commissions have 
expanded enormously, and these commissions seem to be developing into a new and 
unanticipated mechanism of government." Bell, supra note 5, at 6. We may infer that 
the tendency is not unique to President Johnson. 
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the proliferation of government com-
missions lies in the government's difficulty in categorically denying responsibility for 
the parody Iron Mountain Report [L. LEWIN, REPORT FROM !RON MOUNTAIN ON THE 
PossmII.ITY AND DESIRAllILITY OF PEACE (1967)]. The editors of TRANS·ACTION said: 
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that he chose the commission format for his fact-finding and advi-
sory machinery. The Commission he created to "inquire into the 
causes of crime ... and make recommendations for actions which 
can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments, and by pri-
vate citizens and organizations ... "51 consisted of nineteen mem-
bers52 who were given a budget of one million dollars03 and told 
to report in eighteen months.54 
It was not because Johnson was without ideas, or without agents 
able to generate them, that he needed a commisison; many proposals 
for federal action were already available. When Johnson announced 
his intent to create the Commission, he demonstrated independence 
by also announcing that he would shortly send to Congress several 
items of new crime-control legislation: tightened firearms control, 
federal civil commitment for narcotic addicts, control of "psycho-
toxic" drugs not then covered by federal legislation, and a raft of 
other proposals, said to be forthcoming from the Attorney General, 
to deal with organized crime. 55 These were all items which, though 
already incorporated in the President's program at the time the 
Commission was created, the Commission was later to consider as if 
they were new ideas. One of these, the civil commitment proposal, 
was enacted while the Commission still had it under advisement. 
If Johnson had no great need for the suggestions that the Com-
mission was to produce, he did need the assurance that he was doing 
everything that a safe opinion would say the federal administra-
tion should do. He needed a specification of the limits of federal 
responsibility, and he needed one supported by people who would 
carry weight not only with his liberal democratic supporters, but as 
importantly with Goldwater supporters who might be converted.06 
Trans-action has found that those readers who take [the Iron Mountain Report] 
seriously tend to be Government officials. Upon inquiry, sources very close to the 
White House were authorized to say that the files and libraries of the E.xecutive 
Office of the President have been reviewed, and although some reports in the 
general subject area covered by the Report were found, there was no record of 
this particular report. These sources believed, therefore, that no comment was 
appropriate at this time. Informally, they observed that their statement does not 
rule out the possibility that the Report was sponsored either in White House, by 
some Congressional committee, or by some other agency of the Federal Establish-
ment. 
Comment, Social Science Fiction, TRANS-ACTION, Jan.-Feb. 1968, at 7-8. 
51. Exec. Order No. 11,236, I "\\TEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 8 
(1965). 
52. Twenty members were authorized. Id. 
53. S. REP. No. 602, 89th Cong., 1st Ses. l (1965). 
54. Exec. Order No. 11,236, supra note 51. 
55. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, supra note 39, at 1395. 
56. The commissioners "were chosen cross-sectionally the way the Warren Com-
mission was chosen and partly for the same purpose: to calm the country down. 
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From the President's point of view, the political limitations on 
the kind of report to be produced were, though quite specific, fairly 
wide. The report should not transgress programs and ideals to which 
Johnson was already committed; it ought to give the federal govern-
ment something to do; and it ought to be authoritative. 
Unanimity among an appropriately diverse group of commis-
sioners is the key to authority, and the selection of an appropriately 
diverse group of commissioners is an art. The modern Executive 
chooses his commissioners first for whom they represent. 57 In this 
respect the art has advanced considerably over the last thirty-five 
years. The members of the Wickersham Commission were appar-
ently representative only insofar as they came from different sec-
tions of the country.58 Geographic representation, while a consider-
ation in the selection of the latest crime commission's members, 
was a relatively minor one. The key factor today, it has been said, 
is the representation of functional constituencies-groupings de-
fined not by geography but by common interests or purposes.rm The 
goal is to include on a commission persons recognized as responsible 
leaders by each of the groupings that might be concerned with the 
subject matter being studied. In the case of the Crime Commission, 
the constituencies that needed to be represented are easy enough to 
discern-for example, prosecutors, judges, police, Negroes, the or-
ganized bar. It was also necessary that representation come from 
national, state, and local levels of government. One man such as 
James B. Parsons, a Negro federal judge from the Midwest, could 
be used to kill several birds with one stone.60 
Another purpose, and a major one, was to summon prestige behind the crime war 
when LBJ was ready to take the offensive with a program of his own." MacKenzie, 
The Compromise Report on Crime, NEW REPUBUC, Feb. 4, 1967, at 15. 
57. See Bell, Government by Commission, THE PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1966, at 3, 
6-7. Leonard C. Lewin describes the selection of the members of the fictional com-
mission that produced the Iron Mountain Report, L. LEWIN, supra note 50, at xviii, 
xxii-xxiv. One would hope the mutual examination by the commissoners of each 
other's medical dossiers is a bit of an exaggeration. Othenvise the author creates a 
considerable air of verisimilitude. 
58. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAws, H.R. Doc. No. 722, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 
iii (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM REPORT]. 
59. Bell, supra note 57, at 6. 
60. The Commission consisted of Nicholas Katzenbach (chairman), who was Attor-
ney General at the time of his appointment, Genevieve Blatt (representing state prose-
cutors and women), Charles D. Breitel (representing the state judiciary), Kingman 
Brewster, Jr. (representing education), Garrett Byrne (representing local prosecutors), 
Thomas J. Cahill (representing the police), Otis Chandler (representing the press), 
Leon Jaworski (representing the bar), Thomas Lynch (representing state prosecutors), 
Ross L. Malone, Jr. (representing federal prosecutors), William P. Rogers (representing 
federal prosecutors), James B. Parsons (representing the federal judiciary and Negroes), 
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Looked at in one way, it would appear that this kind of diversi-
fication serves the useful purpose of bringing to a commission the 
characteristic positions of all those who are likely to have an active 
interest in a subject. Perhaps more important from the President's 
point of view, however, is the fact that the signators guarantee to 
their own constituents the acceptability of the compromise em-
bodied in the report. 61 Representation is a two-way street. 
The President's problem was to pick a diversified group that 
could yet be brought into agreement. The selection of the con-
stituencies to be represented, fortunately for the President, does 
not determine who shall serve as their representatives on a com-
mission. Few groups are so constituted that the President does not 
have a number of choices. The type of people required are those 
one would characterize as responsible and sound-those who want 
to get the job done, who are dedicated to public service, those who 
are not fanatics but are willing to compromise when necessary to 
achieve a more important goal-in short, people whose very virtues 
can be used against them. 62 
The Crime Commission's report illustrates how successful the 
President can be in achieving unanimity, even among nineteen 
people of diverse backgrounds and interests. Little over six pages 
was required to set out the "additional views"63 of individual mem-
bers respecting a report 300 pages in length and containing over 
200 recommendations affecting every aspect of criminal justice ad-
ministration. As one who has recently attempted to collaborate with 
a joint author in producing a book on but one small aspect of the 
problems under view by the Crime Commission, 64 it is incredible 
to me that essential agreement could have been reached in a mere 
Lewis F. Powell (representing the organized bar), Robert G. Storey (representing the 
bar), Mrs. Robert J. Stuart (representing women and the League of Women Voters), 
Robert F. Wagner (representing mayors), Herbert ·wechsler (representing law profes-
sors), Whitney M. Young, Jr. (representing Negroes), and Luther Youngdahl (repre-
senting the federal judiciary). Presidential Commission, 21 CONGRESSIONAL Q. ALMANAC 
630 (1965). 
61. See note 56 supra. 
62. See Silver, Crime American Style: The President's Commission, COMMONWEAL, 
April 21, 1967, at 141: "The composition of the commission itself, a carefully bal-
anced body consisting of policemen and laymen of varying sociological complexion, 
insured that certain areas would not be analyzed." MacKenzie, The Compromise Re-
port on Crime, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 4, 1967, at 15, 16: 
Byrne, the tough prosecutor, and Luther Youngdahl, the liberal federal judge, are 
natural foes on civil liberties matters, but they agreed that the commission should 
not seriously consider the question of talting out from under the criminal law 
homosexuality involving consenting adults, effectively vetoing the idea. 
63. REPORT 302-08. 
64-. D. OAKS AND w. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JusrrCE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT (1968). 
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eighteen months among nineteen people on 200 recommendations. 
I find some consolation in the difficulties in reaching agreement 
experienced by the Wickersham Commission in its report for Presi-
dent Hoover on the enforcement of Prohibition laws. That report 
included separate statements by all eleven commissioners which in 
aggregate equalled in length the report itself. 65 Of this disagreement 
Chairman "Wickersham said, "as is probably inevitable when eleven 
people of different antecedents and temperaments endeavor to agree 
on a contentious subject [this report] is more or less a compromise 
of varying opinions."66 That such conflict, or at least its manifes-
tation, has proven less than inevitable is probably a tribute to 
Nicholas Katzenbach, chairman of the current Commision, who as 
Life put it, "worked hard for unanimity . . . because the report 
[was] meant not only to inform the public but also to support 
Administration crime bills .... "67 
Even though it must be presumed that the commissioners, hav-
ing agreed to serve, wanted to produce a useful report in the time 
available, one may wonder what magic the Administration used to 
induce virtually complete unanimity. The report would have been, 
if anything, more useful had there been more disagreement, had the 
public been made privy to the disputation that went on behind the 
Commission's closed doors. 
Obviously the Administration may choose whether to play up a 
commission's findings, or to ignore them. A commission's report is 
made to the President. He can publish it or not, and, if he does, 
he can choose the time and place to assure maximum or minimum 
public attention. The President's power to make an unsatisfactory 
report disappear is not without limits. The commissioners may 
have enough independent standing to attract the press, regardless 
of the President; or his own advance publicity may make discreet 
burial impossible. Still there is something of a usable veto power, 
and it has been exercised. 68 
65. Report and statements each ran about eighty pages. 
66. WICKERSHAM REPORT 161. 
67. Stolley, A. Crisis Worse Than Anyone Imagined, LIFE, Feb. 24, 1967, at 24, 25. 
68. The report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and 
Economic Progress was ignored by the administration, apparently because it was too 
controversial. Its publication was announced in an off-hand manner and under cir-
cumstances that would tend to restrict press coverage. Bell, supra note 57, at 4-5. A 
report to a presidential task force, chaired by Joseph Pechman of the Brookings Insti-
tution, which was said to approve the Heller plan for the return to the states of a 
portion of federal income tax revenue, was not even published, perhaps because the 
suggestion had been taken up enthusiastically by Republicans. M. Ostrow, Federal 
Tax Sharing with the States, Dec. 1967 (unpublished student work at Washington 
University). The U.S. Office of Education recently rejected a contract research report 
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For the threat of burial to have the effect of producing a favor-
able consensus, the commissioners had to have reasons to want the 
report published and supported by the President. They had the 
very best reasons-idealism and money. The liberals wanted their 
theories of the cause and cure of criminal behavior and their ideals 
of judicial administration embodied in a presidential program. The 
representatives of the criminal justice establishment wanted federal 
support, financial and moral. 69 
While I am sure that many of the Commission's recommenda-
tions are of value, I would have more confidence in them had they 
been recommended by some person or agency other than this Com-
mission. We may infer from the Commission's organization and the 
short time it had to work that each commissioner had every reason 
to avoid looking closely at those recommendations of his fellows that 
at least in part for making unfavorable mention by name of educators and politicians. 
Wyant, U.S. Rejects City School Critique, St. Louis Post•Dispatch, Nov. 16, 1967, at 
1-C, col. 3. More recently, Mayor Lindsay of New York has repeatedly urged action 
on the recommendations of the Kerner Commission, whose report the President seems 
to be trying to forget. 
By way of contrast, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF NEGROES IN THE UNITED 
STATES, a recent joint report of the Departments of Commerce and Labor was 
issued by the White House with considerable fanfare, including a personal send-
off by the President ..•. Not only was the Persident on hand to kick it off, but 
staff members of the President's Commission on Racial Disorders were tipped to 
the report as the latest word on the matter. Not only was the press specially 
alerted for the report, but a copy was rushed up to one prominent academic 
figure who was supposed to use it to impress business men assembled in a con-
ference on welfare called by Gov. Rockefeller. 
Kraft, The Administration and the Negro, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 3, 1967, at 
3-B, col. 1. The report, says Kraft, tells "us almost nothing new about the Negro," 
comparing it very unfavorably with the Moynihan report. "No doubt there is 
nothing very startling, or even important, about one more mediocre federal study. 
What is startling and important is that the White House thought it was putting out 
a first-class piece of work." Id. Kraft concludes that the contrast between the fanfare 
for and merit of the report evidences the Administration's inability to appreciate or 
make use of sophisticated information. 
Leonard C. Lewin, describing the presumably fictional debate over publication of 
the presumably fictional Iron Mountain Report, said: 
Those who argued the case for keeping the Report secret were admittedly moti-
vated by fear of the explosive political effects that could be expected from pub-
licity. For evidence, they pointed to the suppression of the far less controversial 
report of then-Senator Hubert Humphrey's sub-committee on disarmament in 
1962. (Subcommittee members had reportedly feared that it might be used by 
Communist propagandists, as Senator Stuart Symington put it, to "back up the 
Marxian theory that war production was the reason for the success of capitalism.') 
Similar political precautions had been taken with the better known Gaither Re-
port in 1967, and even with the so-called Moynihan Report in 1965. 
Furthermore, they insisted, a distinction must be made between serious studies, 
which are normally classified unless and until policy makers decide to release 
them, and conventional "showcase" projects, organized to demonstrate a political 
leadership's concern about an issue and to deflect the energy of those pressing 
for action on it. 
REPORT FROM !RON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE xiii (1967). 
69. "No matter how the crime problem is sliced in Washington, it must come out 
pork ..•. " MacKenzie, supra note 56, at 16. 
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were not obviously objectionable, and to expect the same consider-
ation in return. There were enough problems in dealing with dis-
puted issues. To maintain the front, it was necessary that everyone 
have a thoroughly unjustified optimism in the usefulness of every-
one else's projects; hence the optimistic glow of the Commission 
report. To paraphrase Robert Warshaw,7° unfortunately today we 
are likely, almost by reflex, to take pessimism as a measure of hon-
esty. ·when James Q. Wilson, who was one of the Commission's 
advisors, says that there is little we can do to reduce crime short of 
locking up all juveniles,71 he is inherently more believable than is 
the Commission when it introduces its concluding chapter with the 
statement, "America can control crime."72 
The intellectual costs of consensus can be measured in areas 
where we know that there was conflict. By seeing how the Commis-
sion treated issues on which the President was knmvn to have strong 
views with which at least some commissioners disagreed we can get 
and idea how limited is the intellectual contribution of the Com-
mission report. 
President Johnson is kno,vn to be a strong opponent of legalized 
wiretapping and bugging. Apparently he feared that the Commission 
would not agree with him, for he attempted to keep the Commission 
from considering the subject.73 But the Commission took its mvn 
head and after discussion recommended that "Congress should enact 
legislation dealing specifically with wire-tapping and bugging"74-a 
position hardly likely to trouble the President. This does not mean 
that the President misjudged his commissioners' biases. To the 
reader who is attentive, this neutral recommendation comes as a 
surprise. A page earlier the Commission clearly implied its support 
70. See the opening quotation of this Article. 
71. Wilson, Crime in the Streets, THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1966, at 26, 34. 
72. REPORT 279. 
73. See MacKenzie, supra note 56, at 15: 
Ramsey Clark, the acting attorney general, told the commission in November that 
bugging is one of those "red flag items" that gets people mad and diverts atten-
tion from root solutions to the crime problem. Clark and Chairman Katzenbach 
knew that there was very little the commission could tell LBJ about wire tapping 
and bugging; he hates it and he wants Congess to make most of it even more 
illegal than it is now. They knew then, but most of the commissioners did not 
know, that the Justice Department was tracking through its criminal docket to 
purge it of prosecutions tainted through eavesdropping•by•trespass. But bugging 
is an issue hard to dispose of cleanly once it reaches the floor. How Katzenbach 
and Vorenberg Uames Vorenberg, the Commission's executive director], another 
anti•eavesdrop man, managed to let the issue reach showdown proportions [this 
was written before the report was published] in the commission is still an untold 
story. Very likely part of the explanation is Katzenbach's view that the wiretap 
laws could use some "clarification" [clarification is all the report finally recom-
mended] and Vorenberg's refusal to leash the gung-ho section of his staff. 
74. REPORT 203. 
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for the use of electronic eavesdropping devices in crime fighting.75 
The less attentive reader is likely to be taken in by the topological 
device of separating the forthright opinion from the insipid recom-
mendation. Between the two is a very long page of text discussing 
bugging as a threat to privacy and the ambiguity of present law;76 
the latter provides a seemingly logical bridge to a recommendation 
which, if it calls for anything, calls for clarification. 
The Commission's views on recent Supreme Court decisions 
restricting police activity were similarly muted; one is tempted to 
say encoded. Johnson in setting up the Commission had called upon 
it to defend the Court.77 This it apparently could not be brought 
to do, at least not beyond the most minimal and reluctant obei-
sance. 78 The solution was to make no recommendations referring 
directly to the wisdom of Supreme Court decisions; a conservative 
minority was left to raise the issues politely in an additional state-
ment. That statement79 forms no part of the Commission's official 
report but is described by its authors-surprisingly in view of the 
original presidential mandate80-as a venture beyond the bounds 
of the Commission's responsibilities.81 
That is the end of the matter as far as the Commission's official 
position is concerned; nothing which can clearly be taken as the 
voice of the Commission says anything to the contrary. A commis-
sion report, however, operates on several levels. The highest is that 
of the black-letter recommendations, which may be compared to the 
legislative text, and to which it may be assumed the commissioners, 
after close attention, for one reason or another agreed. The next 
75 The Commission quoted with obvious approval the testimony of a New York 
district attorney to the effect that electronic surveillance is "the single most valuable 
weapon in law enforcement's fight against organized crime." It followed this quote 
with its own statement that "[o]nly in New York have law enforcement officials 
achieved some level of continuous success in bringing prosecutions against organized 
crime." REPORT 201. 
76. REPORT 202-03. 
77. See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
78. It conceded the propriety of restricting, after its exposure by the Wickersham 
Commission, the use of the third degree, but explicitly approved no other re• 
strictions (REPORT 93), refused to take a position on Miranda (REPORT 94), and con-
ceded that the problem was one of striking a balance and that the police must be 
controlled, but centered its discussion of these issues around a paragraph that dilated 
at surprising length how police practice over the last thirty years had been cir-
cumscribed (REPORT 93). The result may have satisfied all the competing interests 
on the Commission, but it can hardly satisfy the reader, unless he can be satisfied 
by reading a statement in which he can find expressed his own opinion along with 
its opposite. 
79. REPORT 303-08. 
SO. See text accompanying note 51 supra. 
81. REPORT 308. 
May 1968] The Crime Commission Report 1507 
level is the text of the report, in which the recommendations are 
set. The text, which can be compared to congressional committee 
reports, may or may not be useful in explicating the recommenda-
tions, for it is not entirely clear whether it speaks with the voice of 
the commissioners or the staff. Certainly the commissioners' respon-
sibility for the text is less complete than it is for the recommenda-
tions. Finally there are supplemental reports; 82 these appear most 
often to be the work of advisors-and can be compared with the 
transcripts of legislative hearings-for which the commissioners have 
little or no responsibility. 
It is in the chapter on the police83 that one would expect to find 
the Commission making recommendations relating to the Supreme 
Court's decisions on police procedure, but there is none. The text 
of that chapter, like that of the discussion of wiretapping, is not 
entirely consistent with the lack of any official recommendation. 
Rather, the chapter is replete with secret messages from somewhere 
inside the political cookie factory. Apparently a great deal of aggra-
vation was sublimated in the suggestion that the states, by legislation 
and formal administrative procedure, anticipate the Court's ex-
pected review of the stop-and-frisk problem.84 (The Court has now 
handed dmvn a decision on the stop-and-frisk issue.85) By taking such 
action states could establish something of a record of necessity and 
fair administration so that court review would proceed "under more 
enlightening circumstances."86 That speed was being urged to avoid 
what somebody obviously considered the threat of yet more ill-con-
sidered Supreme Court decisions is a point that can be gathered 
only by reading between the lines.87 In the same vein is the sug-
82. In addition to the principal report there are nine supplemental reports, 
giving additional material on the major subjects considered by the Commission. 
83. REPORT 91-123. 
84. The need for legislative action to pre-empt the courts is discussed at REPORT 
93-95; particular reference to stop-and-frisk laws is made at REPORT 94-95. The need 
for administrative guidelines for police action is discussed at REPORT 103-06. None 
of this discussion explicitly criticizes the Court. Rather, the responsibility is put 
upon state legislators and local police administrators for their failure to communi-
cate their needs to the Court. The police are put in the position of excusing them-
selves for having slipped their toes under the foot of the Supreme Court. The official 
recommendations that administrative police guidelines be formulated is justified on 
a whole raft of grounds, of which aid to the Court is but one. Most of the others 
are silly, e.g., the hopeful suggestion that the guideline-producing police administra-
tor and his staff would act like a corporate board of directors. Individual policemen 
would have removed from their shoulders the burden of making ad hoc decisions. 
Policemen would be forced "to ponder the nature of deterrence." REPORT 106. 
85. Terry v. Ohio, 36 U.S.L.W. 4578 Gune 11, 1968); Sibron v. New York, 36 
U.S.L.W. 4589 Gune 11, 1968). 
86. REPORT 95. 
87. The tactic calls to mind the unsuccessful attempt of James Vorenberg, the 
Commission's director, to formulate standards extrajudicially through the A.L.I. 
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gestion that there may be loopholes in Miranda that police and state 
legislatures could begin exploring.88 
But whose messages are these? They may come from disaffected 
staff members who are wont to see what they can put over on their 
superiors, garnering whatever solace for intellectual prostitution 
can be had from whispering, "I am Lazarus, come from the dead, 
come back to tell you all, I shall tell all." Or maybe it is the commis-
sioners who "have bitten off the matter with a smile ... squeezed 
the universe into a ball [ and rolled] it toward some overwhelming 
question. . .. "89 
To put the question of authorship demonstrates the absurdity 
of the game. In doing so we concede that the significance of the 
report lies not in what is said but rather in who said it, and that 
the question to be asked of a commission report is not the wisdom 
of its proposals but the intent of its authors. 
On one issue in which the President was interested the Com-
mission made it quite clear that there was disagreement. Johnson 
had publicly supported civil commitment of narcotic addicts in the 
same message in which he announced that a Crime Commission 
was to be appointed.90 Despite Johnson's having gone out on a limb, 
the Commission took the position on civil commitment that "results 
are still too fragmentary, and experience still too limited, to permit 
anything more than tentative judgments."91 It followed that remark 
with a full page describing the arguments pro and con.92 By the 
time of publication the issue was moot, for the bill had been passed.03 
The frank admission of disagreement and inadequate informa-
tion on this issue betrays the defeat of intellect by politics, and of 
virtue by advantage, to which a presidential commission is sus-
ceptible. Lack of consensus is permissible where the issue involved 
is politically unimportant; on issues where feelings run high, no 
matter how reasonable the dispute that engenders those feelings, 
disagreement must be submerged for the benefit of the program, 
for unanimity. 
Model Pre-Arraignment Code. See MacKenzie, supra note 56, and Justice Harlan's 
dissent in Miranda in which he called attention to efforts underway outside the 
Court to solve the constitutional problems posed during the pre-arraignment period. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 523-24 (1966). 
88. REPORT 94. 
89. T. S. ELIOT, The Love Song of J. Alfred Pru/rock, in COLLECTED POEMS 11, 15 
(1930). 
90. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, 21 CONGRESSIONAL Q. AL-
llfANAC 1394, 1395 (1965). 
91. REPORT 228. 
92. REPORT 229. 
93. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (Supp. 1966). 
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IV. WILL THE REAL CRIMINALS PLEASE STAND UP 
Though President Johnson dissociated himself from the Gold-
water explanations for the crime problem, he never questioned 
Goldwater's assumption that the problem had suddenly reached such 
dramatic proportions as would justify declaring an informal na-
tional emergency. He did not list among the duties assigned to the 
Commission-in either his congressional message94 or the executive 
order by which he created the Commission95-the task of measuring 
the volume of crime. He was satisfied, apparently, with his own 
statement that the crime rate had doubled since 1940 and since 1958 
has been increasing five to six times as fast as the population 
growth.06 
It was, of course, desirable that there be a crime crisis. If it is 
hard to prove that it exists, it is at least as hard to prove it does 
not.07 Johnson could not easily stand up to the nation and say, 
"Folks, you've all been mistaken. Them newspaper writers been 
misleadin' you again." It would be hard, even if he was right. And 
the easier (if not the correct) road for Johnson was also the more 
attractive for his commissioners. There would have been no medals 
to be handed around without a war to wage. 
The fact that all participants stood a step closer to realizing 
many personal goals, albeit idealistic ones, if the crime problem 
had reached, crisis proportions does not prove that there has been 
no crime increase. Yet surely it gives us reason to look closely at 
what the Commission has to say on the subject, for the Commission, 
though not directed to do so, felt compelled to ask how much crime 
there is and whether there is more now than there used to be. 
What constitutes a crime crisis should be an objective question. 
A crime crisis would consist in an increasing crime rate, caused by 
factors not likely to disappear in time, where it is likely that the 
increase will be of sufficient magnitude to destroy or significantly 
modify the social order and where it appears that these changes will 
occur unless prompt action is taken. A crisis does not exist because 
people have had called to their attention a problem that has existed 
unnoticed for a long time. Nor does a crisis exist simply because a 
transitory cause intensifies for a time some recognized evil. But 
while the question is theoretically objective, in practice it is not. 
94. See note 90 supra. 
95. See note 51 supra. 
96. Message, supra note 90, at 1394. 
97. On the inadequacy of statistics on such matters, see D. OAKS &: W. LEHMAN, 
supra note 64, at 18-27 (1968). 
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We cannot know with certainty, in the present state of the social 
sciences or of statistical recording, whether the tests of a genuine 
crisis have been met. We must each make our own judgment from 
what limited information is available. 
Whatever standards we apply to define crime crises, we must 
begin with a seemingly simple calculation: the total amount of 
crime today compared with the amount extant at some base point 
in the past. To obtain the figures we must depend upon police 
reports, and these reports show, indeed, a steady increase in the 
number of crimes committed since the Second World War. But that 
does not answer the question. For one thing, we know that police 
reports are inaccurate. Unfortunately, we don't know how inaccu-
rate, but there are a variety of reasons for supposing that police 
reports tend to exaggerate the crime increase. 
The Commission considered in some detail the distortions in 
our perception of the crime problem that are produced by fuller 
crime reporting.98 But, having discussed the problem, the Commis-
sion continued to behave as if the only possible interpretation of 
the data was that the needed crime crisis exists. We shall explore 
for the balance of this section, in the light of what is knmvn of 
crime statistics, the ambiguity of that "crisis." 
The Commission tells us that there is everywhere a great reser-
voir of criminal acts that are never reported to the police. 00 It is 
possible, however, and even likely, that as the public has become 
more sensitive to crime its members have reported to the police a 
higher percentage of the crimes of which they are aware. This is 
thought to be particularly true among minority group members, 
who have long experienced high crime rates, but who in the past 
have been unable or unwilling to complain.100 It is also possible 
that the automobile has brought some of those, who in earlier days 
would have confined their criminal activities to the ghetto, into resi-
dential areas where the likelihood of a report to the police is quite 
high. Besides both poor and rich feeling more reason to complain, 
it may be that today more people of all classes feel the police can 
and will do something about crimes; it seems reasonably clear that 
police are on the whole more professional and less corrupt today than 
98. REPORT 25-27. A further and more pointed presentation is provided in Wilson, 
supra note 71. 
99. REPORT 20-22. 
100. See REPORT 20-22. See also Rainwater, Open Letter on White Justice and the 
Riots, TRANs•ACTION, Sept. 1967, at 22, 26-27; Kraft, Ghetto Hoodlums and Police, 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 17, 1967, at 3-E, col. 1. 
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they have been for a very long time.101 Finally, widespread insuring 
of personal property encourages people to report theft and property 
damage to the police102 (and inspires at least some people to support 
phony insurance claims with equally phony police reports). 
It is also possible that the police are reporting more of the crim-
inal acts they know about. A change in police reporting practices 
may come about for a number of reasons: a police department, hav-
ing under-reported for years in order to protect a city administra-
tion's reputation, may begin to look foolish when the crime rate 
it reports falls far below that reported by cities of comparable 
size.103 Eventually, someone demands "accurate" statistics and a 
large and abrupt jump in the crime rate appears almost overnight. 
Moreover, as policemen become more professional they are much 
more likely to make written reports of all incidents coming to their 
attention; such reports provide the basis for fuller tabulation.10' 
Finally, it may be that the police report more crime because as 
community standards have changed so have those of the police. 
Things may look serious to the policeman of today that would not 
have concerned him ten, twenty, or thirty years ago. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in tabulating crime tries to make 
compensation in its reported national totals when a city's police 
force suddenly begins fuller reporting-a not very satisfactory 
101. The reason most frequently given by respondents in the Commission's study 
of unreported crime for the victim's failure to report is his belief that the police 
cannot or will not do anything about it. R.fil>ORT 22. The Commission did not con-
sider whether there was any trend in this belief, any more than it considered whether 
there was a trend in failure to report generally. See note 116 infra. 
Claude Brown, in MANCHU.D IN THE PROMISED LAND 405, had been looking for 
Skippy, a man who had knifed Claude's mother: "I never found Skippy either. The 
police found him. That was surprising, that the police would really find somebody-
that they'd really look for somebody for two weeks-for having hurt somebody else 
in Harlem. I guess Harlem was changing." 
102. See REPORT 27. In discussing insurance, the Commission fails to note the 
possibility of an increase in phony crime reports entered with a view to collecting 
insurance. The point is made by Wilson, supra note 71, at 27. The Commission sug-
gests that the high proportion of all auto thefts that are reported to the police is 
evidence of the importance of insurance in getting people to report. There seem other 
sufficient explanations for the unusual rate at which auto theft is reported: the value 
of automobiles (it is low value thefts that go unreported); the high rate of recovery, 
if not conviction (it is pessimism that discourages complaints); and the utility and 
importance of the auto in most people's lives. 
103. See the Commission's comparison of New York and Chicago crime rates, 
REPORT 26. 
104. This does not necessarily mean more accurate. A policeman has a great deal 
of discretion as to what he will report as crime. In many of these instances there is 
no correct answer, but a consistent definition can markedly affect the impression 
created either of the success of the police in solving crime, or of the crime rate. 
D. OAKS &: W. LEHMAN, supra note 64, at 20·22 (1968). 
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process105-but even this procedure cannot compensate at all for 
the changes that take place gradually, either in the pattern of citizen 
reporting to the police or of police reporting to the FBI.106 
Despite all doubt about the accuracy of police statistics, no one 
questions that there has been a significant increase in the absolute 
number of crimes committed in America over the last nventy-five 
years-if only because there are more people in America. And 
though the problem of exaggeration becomes more difficult in assess-
ing percentages, few would seriously doubt that the number of 
crimes committed has increased at a faster rate than the increase in 
the number of people. Few would doubt that there are now more 
crimes committed per 100,000 population than there were in 1940. 
That, in a nutshell, is the crisis. That, however, is not the end but 
rather the real beginning of the inquiry. 
There is very good reason for believing that there has been an 
increase in the rate of crime. If there were not such an increase it 
would mean that our society had grown surprisingly more moral 
in the last twenty-five years. Crime, we know, is committed in dis-
proportionate amounts by certain groups in our society, most 
notably by young persons. Because of the post-war baby boom, the 
proportion of young people in the population has been increasing 
dramatically-fast enough to change the whole tenor of our society. 
Thus, if the rate at which young people commit crime remained 
exactly the same over the last twenty-five years, the crime rate for 
the society as a whole would have to rise. If the crime rate did not 
go up, it would mean that young people today are committing crimes 
much less frequently than ever before. This conclusion seems so 
implausible as to justify our belief that police statistics are accurate 
in evidencing at least some fairly large increase in the crime rate.107 
105. The discounting method is described in REPORT 26 and in more detail in 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK 
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 211 (1967). 
106. An additional factor influencing the interpretation of crime statistics (though 
not necessarily the total volume of crime) is inflation. The point at which the value 
of a stolen article will support a felony rather than a misdemeanor charge has 
remained unchanged, while the value of articles has gone up (or the value of money 
down). The FBI's figures on theft of articles valued in excess of $50 are subject not 
only to reporting but to monetary inflation. See S. ELKIN, A BAD MAN 161 (1967): 
And I'll tell you something else. Science in its development of transistorized 
equipment has made our problem tougher. A thief's armload today is worth 
more than a thief's armload was yesterday, and a thief's armload tomorrow 
will be worth even more. I foresee a time when the thief's armload will be 
approximate in value to the thief's truckload of yesteryear. That's what science 
has done with its vaunted miniaturization. 
107. The recent migrant to the city slum raises exactly the same sort of problem 
as does the juvenile. The inner city poor constitute another demographic subgroup--
a subgroup witlx a high overlap with the subgroup of the young-that is responsible 
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At this point, the problem of the inflation of the absolute num-
ber of crimes becomes crucial. If the crime rate has increased only 
as rapidly as we would expect, considering the increase in the num-
ber of juveniles, our situation looks rather different than if the 
crime rate is increasing significantly more rapidly than expected. 
There is disagreement on this issue. The Commission is prepared to 
allow that about half of the crime increase can be explained by 
demographic changes.108 That means that the other half of the 
increase is due to our becoming somehow worse as a society. Others 
believe that almost all the increase in the crime rate can be attributed 
to demographic changes.109 If that is true, we are no worse a society 
than nventy-five years ago. The crime crisis boils down, not to our 
for a disproportionate amount of crime. Like the subgroup of the young, that of 
the inner city poor may be in process of transit to another status. As early as the 
Wickersham Report it was clear that the ethnic groups that had graduated from the 
ghetto into the upper world lost with that movement a propensity to commit crime 
that some had thought genetic. That fact was determined through a commission 
financed study conducted by Clifford Shaw and John McKay. 2 WICKERSHAM REPORT 
338-39 (1931). The absorption of Negroes by the upper world may well be slower 
than that of other groups (as it certainly has been so far), for there is no group 
pushing in to replace Negroes at the bottom. 
108. REPORT 28. The Commission's figure takes into consideration total popula-
tion growth and the growth in the proportion of young people. While the Com-
mission says these changes could account for 40-50% of the change, the figures on 
which the Commission bases its conclusion attribute 49% of the change to these 
t\vo factors. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK 
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN AssEssMENT 209 (1967). In the same ap-
pendix, The Prediction of Crime From Demographic Variables: A Methodological 
Note, id. 207-10, the unidentified author attempts to determine the impact of other 
demographic variables--place (urban-rural), sex, and race-in various combinations. 
Some combinations, because of inadequate data, could not be computed. It was impos-
sible, for instance, to compute the total effect of race, sex, and age. Id. at 208. A com-
bination of changes in population, race, and place could account for a 46% increase 
in crime, id. at 209. The combined effects of changes in population and age account for 
the 49% increase mentioned. Obviously, the combination of race and age would ac-
count for more. The unidentified author concludes that "much of the change in the 
volume of crime appears to be accounted for by these demographic changes. If it were 
also possible to get arrest information for each sex and age group within each race 
and place category, the proportion accounted for would undoubtedly be increased 
considerably.'' Id. at 209. In implying that this study supports a conclusion that as lit-
tle as 40% of the increase can be attributed to demographic changes, the Commission 
acted dishonestly. The anonymous author's calculations incidentally do not include 
any discount in crime figures for inflation attributable to reporting changes, except 
such as the FBI makes in its Uniform Crime Reports. See text accompanying note 105 
supra. 
109. Wilson, supra note 71, at 31-32 reports a study, SPACE GENERAL CORPORATION, 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1965), made for the California 
Youth and Adult Correction Agency. By calculating crime by age group "there is 
hardly any increase in the rate at all over the period 1960-1965. And if we consider 
violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) instead of all 'serious' 
crimes, the increase all but disappears.'' Wilson, supra note 71, at 31. Wilson con-
cludes, "For the present, the only sure way we know of fighting crime is birth con-
trol." Id, at 32. 
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having gotten worse, but to our not having gotten better fast 
enough-to our failure to improve rapidly the moral attitudes of 
our young people. We could determine which of these conclusions 
is correct only if we had accurate figures on the absolute number 
of crimes. Without accurate figures, our judgment on the question 
of whether we have gotten worse depends upon how much we choose 
to discount police reports in light of the known but immeasurable 
forces inflating them. 
All the rhetoric of the Great Society aside, it is a rather different 
thing to assert that as a society we have fallen away from standards 
that had been earlier attained than to assert that we must become 
suddenly, say, twenty-five per cent better than we ever have been 
before to solve the crime problem. The possibility of return to a 
previous height is a little less problematical than that of achieving 
a height not before attained. Moreover, if improvement of the so-
ciety, rather than staving off a rout, is our goal, revolutionizing the 
criminal justice system seems to be one of the least direct paths 
toward achieving it. A revolution in street sweeping would be argu-
ably almost as helpful.110 If, on the other hand, it is true that we 
are getting worse, that in prosperous middle age our national moral-
ity has come unhinged, we could conceivably decide that we want 
to be saved from ourselves regardless of the cost in otherwise un-
palatably efficient and professional policing, distasteful invasion of 
privacy, 111 and inhuman remorselessness in prosecution. These are 
110. The question of the usefulness of changes in the criminal justice system is 
considered at greater length below. See text accompanying notes 128-37 infra. The first 
proposal concerning the system that one would consider would be to increase its 
capacity in the light of its seemingly inevitable increase in business. We might decide, 
however, that because the demand will peak out and presumably decrease eventually, 
we don't want to overbuild, i.e., build a system that will exceed demand in more normal 
times. The problem is of the same type as trying to decide how many subway cars to 
buy. The decision as a practical matter can be neither so few that all seats will be 
filled at mid-day, nor so many that no one will stand at rush hour. 
111. With all the modem gadgets. "The state of the art [of scientific crime detec-
tion] today is such that we can provide a fantastic amount of security to people if 
they are willing to put up with it." A statement of Arnold Sagalyn, "the Treasury 
Department's director of law enforcement,'' quoted in Anderson, Why Crime Pays, 
PARADE, Aug. 27, 1967, at 6, 7. The article describes closed circuit television monitor-
ing of buildings against burglary, odor sensors that might allow detection from the 
outside of buildings of marijuana or people on the inside, and an auto surveillance 
system that could detect not only theft but speeding violations. The author con-
cludes, "Clearly, the public must make some sacrifices if crime is not to rage com-
pletely out of control." Id. at 7. A report, drafted by Professor Louis Sohn for sub-
mission to the United Nations by the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace 
calls for the creation of an agency to "study the implications of scientific and tech-
nological development for human rights and fundamental freedoms • • • ." Among 
other items, the report was concerned with electronic surveillance and the proposed 
national data bank. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 5, 1967, at lOA, col. 1. 
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the kinds of policy issues that depend on the vital but unresolved 
statistical questions. 
Our factual situation in respect to crime may then correspond, 
as far as the Commission or anyone else knows, to either of these 
models, to a combination of them, or perhaps to some others.112 If, 
in the face of these analytical difficulties, the Commission had made 
clear at least some of the choices open to society and the ambiguity 
of the evidence on which those choices must be made, it would have 
done a conscientious and commendable job, opening for reasonable 
discussion the choices that face us. 
Unfortunately, the Commission did no such thing. It confessed 
its inability to decide whether Americans are more criminal some-
where in the middle of the chapter on criminal statistics.113 Through-
out the rest of the text, however, the Commission acted as if it had 
discovered that Americans are today more criminal than ever before. 
A crisis mentality pervades the work, exemplified by the introduc-
tory statement that "[t]he criminal justice system is faced with too 
urgent a need for action to stand back for a generation and engage 
in research."114 The Commission's commitment to one side of an 
argument it admitted it could not settle is evidenced in a variety 
of ways: 
-The summary preceding the report, which is all that many will 
read, fails to mention the statistical reservation but emphasizes one 
study showing that almost everyone has committed serious crimes 
112. The two models so far constructed are by no means the only possible ones. Let 
me briefly suggest two others. One is that many people have become convinced there 
is more crime and have changed their life patterns accordingly. This, it will be seen 
immediately, may in part be a self-fulfilling prophecy, for to the extent that the 
streets are abandoned by the decent and law-abiding they are available for anschluss 
by the criminal imperialists of the slum. I consider it a very plausible argument that 
if there has been any increase in crime it is due, via this mechanism, to more 
"accurate" crime reporting. If the problem is that people believe there to be more 
crime, we have yet another possible policy choice: the appearance of doing something 
to fight the supposed crime increase. A doctor would call such medication a placebo. 
Even if a real increase in crime followed an imagined increase, the placebo would 
still solve the problem by returning the streets and parks to the law-abiding. 
Another model would assume that people in our society have become increasingly 
intolerant of crime, or that urban society has become too delicate and refined a mech-
anism to withstand the levels of crime accepted in the past as normal, though not 
desirable. These two statements may simply be different ways of saying the same thing 
-that as people get closer together they must place more reliance on the absence of 
criminality in their fellows, else, else-well, else they will have to expend too high a 
proportion of their time and energy worrying about the safety of themselves and their 
property. Not wanting to spend so much time, they worry and urge upon the institu-
tions of the state that these institutions become more zealous and effective in fighting 
crime, 
113. The critical reservations are expressed in point 3 of the Commission's conclu-
sions on the amount and trend of crime. REPORT 31. 
114, REPORT 13, 
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and another showing that there is a great volume of crime no one 
ever reports.115 
-The detailed description, in the text, of the study of unre-
ported crime leaves the clear implication that failure to report is a 
new phenomenon, and hence that the crisis is even greater than re-
ported crime would make it appear.116 
-Finally, if the crime increase is generational, no explanation is 
needed for it beyond population statistics. The Commission explains 
the increase in crime as a symptom of moral and social decay, thereby 
clearly evidencing its psychological dissatisfaction with the demo-
graphic analysis that it was unable to reject intellectually.117 
That my concern with the Commission's approach to the volume 
of crime is not petty is evidenced by Life magazine's article on the 
report, which was headed "A Crisis Worse Than Anyone Imag-
ined."118 In support of that assertion Life offered the evidence of the 
Commission's study on unreported crime.119 It is probably upon 
this article that most reading Americans depended for their knowl-
edge of the Crime Commission report. It was the horror stories that 
115. See REPORT at v. 
116. See REPORT 20-22. "Although the police statistics indicate a lot of crime today, 
they do not begin to indicate the full amount." Id. at 20 (emphasis added). "These 
surveys show that the actual amount of crime in the United States today is several 
times that reported in the U[niform] C[rime] R[eport]." Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
Neither of the today's are necessary and there is nowhere a suggestion that the failure 
to report may have been common in the past, perhaps, as far as the Commission 
knows, even more common than it is now. It may have come as a shock to the com-
missioners that so many people fail to report crime. (The Commission was easily 
surprised by the ordinary behavior of ordinary people. "Surprisingly, 23 percent 
[of neighborhood business owners] were unable to give any estimate at all of the 
amount of their losses due to shoplifting." REPORT at 43. Personally, I was dismayed 
that 77% of small merchants would keep inventory records adequate to betray how 
badly they'd been done. It's like the wife putting a notch in her bed-post every time 
her husband's been unfaithful-a sort of response that would be considered unhealthy 
by every lovelorn columnist I've read. The Commission may have been surprised but 
its misrepresentation of the significance of the unreported crime survey was unforgiv-
able.) 
117. An outline of the Commission's causal analysis will be found in REPORT 5-6. 
It includes such notions as the following: 
An abundance of material goods provides an abundance of motives an'd oppor-
tunities for stealing .•.• 
. • • [P]arental, and especially paternal, authority over young people is becoming 
weaker .... The community's social institutions have so far not found ways to give 
young people the motivation to lead moral lives; some of them have not even 
recognized their duty to seek for such ways. • • • [There is an] enormous gap 
between American ideals and American achievements • • • • 
A city man is often . . • socially isolated from his neighborhood and there-
fore incapable [sic] of being controlled by it. 
[N]o system ••. will rid a society of crime if there is not a widespread ethical 
motivation . . • . [Emphasis added.] 
118. LIFE, Feb. 24, 1967, at 24. 
119. Id. 
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were ultimately conveyed to the public, not the more subtle statis-
tical reservations that raise the question of whether the horror 
stories were justified. The horror stories have had their effect. The 
organized bar, for instance, has swallowed the Commission report 
hook, line, and sinker.120 
V. WHAT'S THE PROGRAM? 
In a way, it is unfair to respond to the Commission that there 
may well be no crisis. After all, it is desirable to reduce crime no 
matter what its present level. And some activities may be worth 
undertaking, though they have no measurable effect on the crime 
rate, simply in the name of justice, humanity, knowledge, or econ-
omy. But if there is no crime crisis we can consider proposals a 
little more carefully before acting upon them. If the world has ever 
been as we find it now, it will not disintegrate while we mull a 
little longer the question of its improvement. Whatever the force 
of the argument that we must move against present evil, though 
we move in ignorance,121 that force is adequately met by examples 
such as the sanitation system that spreads disease, 122 the housing 
program that removes the roof from over the poor man's head, the 
minimum-wage law that puts him out of work, and the consumer 
credit law that drives him to bankruptcy.123 It is not better in the 
fire than in the frying pan. 
If the reader will concede that, absent a crisis, engaging in 
thought is an appropriate precursor to taking action, he ought to 
concede the same even if he thinks that there may be a crisis. The 
argument is the same unless we are reasonably sure that our society 
is about to collapse in a whimper of decay and fearfulness. (In that 
event, we may be excused even for turning to witch doctors.) But 
the Commission makes no such case. The strongest statement that 
can be made with certainty is that we have some time to spend with 
Mercury for nights spent long ago with Venus. 
It is equally true that we need not hurry if the palliatives under 
consideration bear no relation to the crime rate. Whether they are 
120. See, e.g., Welliver, The President's Page, 23 Mo. BAR J. 391 (Sept. 1967). 
121. The Commission poses the problem in these terms: "Crime is a continuing and 
urgent reality with which we must deal as effectively as we can. We cannot await 
final answers. The alternatives are not whether to act or not, but whether to act wisely 
or unwisely.'' REPORT 273. That statement follows by half a page the statement that, 
"what [the Commission] has found to be the greatest need is the need to know." Id. 
122. See H. SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 351 (1914 ed. combined with and 
published under title of SOCIAL STATICS). 
123. See Satter, Consumer Credit Remedies-An Evaluation, 13 DECALOGUE J. 7 
(1962). 
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useful and come without unacceptable costs can be considered at 
relative leisure-not because we scorn improvement, but because 
we want reasonable assurance that we are improving. But whether 
or not the activities commended to us may justly be undertaken for 
reasons other than their tendency to reduce crime, we are bound 
to consider the Commission's program in the terms in which it was 
elicited and offered: as a program for reducing crime. As a first 
approach to that question, we ask whether the criminal justice sys-
tem is a mechanism to which we can resort with optimism in the 
effort to achieve that goal. It is, after all, to the criminal justice sys-
tem that most of the Commission's recommendations are directed. 
A. An Expected Optimism 
While the Commission presented a pessimistic view of our pres-
ent situation, it presented an optimistic one of the likelihood of 
success in controlling,124 nay reducing, the incidence of crime.125 
(I decline to debate whether these promises can properly be attrib-
uted to the commissioners;126 they will be so interpreted by the 
public, and the commissioners are inevitably parties to them.) This 
optimism was necessary if the Commission's suggestions were to be 
acted upon with enthusiasm and alacrity. And it goes without saying 
that had his commissioners equivocated on many of the recommen-
dations they were to make, as they did on the federal civil commit-
ment issue, President Johnson would not have been happy. After all, 
he wanted a program, not a confession of ignorance, even though the 
latter might have been more appropriate. 
When the promise of improvement is first presented to the 
reader, it is accompanied by an "if"-"[i]f the following [seven] ob-
jectives are rigorously pursued."127 The objectives include more 
money for the criminal justice system, more research about it, more 
and better people working in it, the elimination from it of injustice, 
more imaginative treatment of those captured in its toils, and, fi-
nally, a better society. The seventh recommendation is for citizens 
rigorously to pursue the other six, especially the five related to the 
system. The imbalance between recommendations for societal im-
provement and those for improvement of the system sufficiently 
124. REPORT 279. 
125. REPORT at vi. 
126. See text following note 81 supra. There is, however, internal evidence that this 
view is that of the Commission: "[T]he Commission is sure that the Nation can control 
crime if it will." REPORT at xi. 
127. REPORT at vi. 
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reflects the attention given each in the rest of the report. The im-
balance may be explained by the relative ease of fiddling with the 
criminal justice system; it may be explained by the interests of the 
commissioners and their staff; and it may be explained by the politi-
cal attractiveness of dealing with crime as an institutional problem 
for which the citizenry is not really responsible. It certainly cannot 
be explained by the effectiveness of the criminal justice system as a 
means of reducing crime. The criminal justice system is not much 
of a lever with which to move the society.128 To paraphrase Learned 
Hand: righteousness lies in the hearts of men and women; when it 
dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no consti-
tution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.129 That this 
is more than an appealing aphorism can, I think, be demonstrated 
if we consider why it is that most people do not commit crime. 
It cannot be true that those of us who usually behave acceptably 
do so out of fear of punishment; a moment's introspection should 
make that clear. When we avoid evil in the normal case there is no 
conflict at all-no desire to do evil deflects our course. If the con-
trary were true, ulcers, mental breakdowns, and alcoholism would 
be not merely endemic in our society but universal. And even when 
a crevice in the subconscious betrays a dark, unseemly desire, the 
conscious is more likely to dispose of it in terms of right and ·wrong 
(really a sensed abhorrence) than in the terms of the likelihood of 
criminal punishment. If the most important factor in keeping crime 
down is our shared feeling of propriety, we ought ask what the 
criminal justice system can do by way of defining and strengthening 
the conscience of the community. 
It is clear that the criminal justice system can affect particular 
judgments. By defining behavior as right or wrong, the law prob-
ably influences the judgments of many, if not most, of those who 
are generally predisposed to obey the law. But influencing the judg-
128. Leverage can be taken here in a mechanical sense as it is when we speak of 
the leverage obtained through borrowed money. The notion is related to those of 
dampening and amplification discussed in D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JusnCE 
SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 187 (1968). Leverage is appropriate when looking at the 
problem from the actor's point of view. Amplification and dampening describe the 
problem from the point of view of the system being acted upon. 
129. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (3d ed. 1960). Francis Allen reached a 
similar conclusion in THE BORDERLANDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59 (1964): "[I]t seems likely 
that the [juvenile] court's contributions to the eradication of the delinquency will be 
limited and peripheral.'' He adds, "[I]t may be true that the tendency to attribute 
capabilities to the court that it does not possess represents to some degree a largely 
unpremeditated effort to evade the necessity of accepting more fundamental and less 
comfortable alternatives.'' Id. at 60. 
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ment of the law-abiding respecting particular behavior is not the 
issue here.130 The problem with which the Commission was con-
cerned was that of encouraging general willingness to obey laws 
demanding respect for our property and persons, laws that have 
already been defined and accepted by the majority as right. 
Can the criminal justice system do anything in this direction? 
Let us consider three mechanisms by which it might be supposed 
that the system could encourage in the society's members the notion 
that the law ought to be obeyed: through procedural fairness and 
decency, through severity and certainty of punishment, and through 
the treatment of those whom the system convicts. 
Presumably some amount of criminal activity is occasioned by 
a perceived unfairness in the social order, an unfairness either to 
the individual criminal or to a group of which he considers himself 
a member. It may be that the fairness of the legal system affects the 
potential criminal's view of the society as a whole-that the system 
is the society's surrogate. However, for most people the criminal 
justice system is merely a relatively small element of their experi-
ence of society.131 Under these circumstances the fairness of the 
system can affect the perception of the society as a whole only when 
the system creates impressions radically more or less favorable than 
those created by the rest of the society. This does not mean that the 
police, for instance, cannot come to symbolize oppression. It means, 
however, that improvement of police practices would not much 
influence the oppressed group's view of the society as a whole, or 
even of the police. If occasions of police misbehavior are being 
sought as justification for expressing discontent, they will be 
found.132 The weight of social inequity cannot be placed upon the 
shoulders of the police with any reasonable optimism that they can 
successfully bear it. 
130. On the circumstances for success in that venture, see D. OAKS & w·. LEHMAN, 
supra note 128, at 188-90 (1968). 
131. Admittedly the police play a larger role in the life of the ghetto dweller than 
in the life of the white middle class. Still the law is a relatively small part of life. 
132. See REPORT 37; Parmetter, Breakdown of Law and Order, TRANS·ACTION, Sept. 
1967, at 13 ("The Detroit riots started in a police raid on what is known locally with 
self-conscious quaintness as a blind pig, an after-hours tavern."); L. Rainwater, Open 
Letter on White Justice and the Riots, TRANs-AcrION, Sept. 1967, at 22, 26-27 (empha-
sis added): 
There is always deep conflict and ambivalence in the ghetto over the issue of 
police protection versus police harassment. The ghetto is a dangerous place 
for its inhabitants, and they would like to have firm and competent police sur-
veillance. On the other hand, that very surveillance carries with it the danger 
of unjust and unseemly behavior by the police. Police rationality dictates that 
anyone in the ghetto is more suspect of crime than anyone in a white middle class 
neighborhood. From the police point of view, then, ghetto residents should be 
more willing to cooperate by answering questions and accepting arrest. The conflict 
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Improvement in the fairness of the criminal justice system, 
therefore, can have only marginal effect on the moral judgments 
of the potential criminal and hence on the crime rate unless the 
system is so radically improved that every police, magisterial, and 
judicial decision is made with the wisdom of Solomon. This result 
would follow if, in determining the perceived fairness of the society, 
the judicial system were as significant as the economic system; it is 
the more true since quite obviously the latter is far more influential 
in determining our over-all view of the social order. It follows that 
a relatively minor redistribution of wealth in the society or rear-
rangement in the opportunity structure could be expected to have 
a more radical effect than transfusing all the wisdom of the Supreme 
Court into the mind of every policeman on the streets. 
Perhaps the system, through the punishment it metes out, gains 
the leverage with the potential criminal that it lacks in its role as 
surrogate for the society. But the threat of the law is a very inade-
quate means of preventing crime, because it depends upon the effi-
ciency of a notoriously ineffectual system. The cost of an efficiency 
that would frighten people into acceptable behavior is not com-
patible with the conditions of a free society.133 If but twenty per 
cent of all crimes are followed by conviction, which is probably an 
optimistic estimate,134 a fifty per cent increase in the success of the 
criminal justice system would increase the conviction rate to but 
thirty per cent-changing the odds of being penalized from one in 
five to three in ten. Such a change seems unlikely to frighten a 
potential criminal very much, yet it would require a revolution in 
the criminal justice system of almost unimaginable proportions. 
The threat of the law is most likely to be effective with those 
who, though they may be tempted to violate a specific law-evade 
income taxes, for instance, or drink at prohibited times or places-
already respect the system generally and are inclined to obey its 
laws. Such people, I say on the basis of introspection, fear not so 
much the punishment the system on its mm can mete out (they 
built into this kind of situation can perhaps be somewhat ameliorated by more 
integrated police forces, and by vigorous supervision of the police to see they are 
not impolite or overly aggressive. But that is no real solution to the problem. 
133. See, e.g., note 111 supra. 
134. A Commission field study indicated that 25% of a sample of 1,905 crimes 
reported in Los Angeles were cleared by apprehension or arrest. REPORT 247-48. If 
Los Angeles' experience is anything like Chicago's, half of the persons arrested never 
get to court. D. OAKS &: W. LEHMAN, supra note 128, at 31-35 (1968). Further, the Com-
mission's study of unreported crime indicates that at the very least half of all crimes 
are unreported. REPORT 20-22. It is at least possible that as few as 5% of all crimes 
result in punishment for the offender. 
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may even wonder how they would bear up under prison conditions), 
but the punishments that accrue in addition to the prison sentence 
because of their very participation in and acceptance of the society. 
They do not want to be thought of as bad; they do not want to be 
separated from the sort of society they have become accustomed to 
and value; they do not want to lose contact with their possessions. 
The effectiveness of a penalty imposed by a court therefore depends 
upon an already existing attachment to society. Thus, the more dis-
affected a person, the less leverage the system has on him, even 
through fear.135 
But the question we ask is not whether the system can enforce 
a grudging conformity through fear, but whether the spectacle of 
other people being punished can induce the feeling that laws in 
general ought to be obeyed. Certainly one would expect that pun-
ishment too uncertain or too mild would encourage the disaffection 
of those otherwise disposed to obey the law. Nobody wants to be 
taken for a sucker. The belief that others are getting away with 
things may lead the law abiding to question their obligation to the 
system. But is the opposite true within any useful limits? 
The actual spectacle of criminals suffering is a pleasure today 
denied most of us. At best, we may imagine the pain when, now 
with decreasing frequency, a capital sentence is carried out and 
publicized. We do not ordinarily spend much of our time empathiz-
ing in horror with the life of a prison inmate. That is not to say 
that there is no gratification or reinforcement in seeing someone 
punished. But I do not think we really need much of that kind of 
reinforcement.136 Occasionally seeing someone getting a traffic ticket 
135. This is hardly an original observation. Dickens, describing the England of 
1775, said: 
Daring burglaries by armed men, and highway robberies, took place in the capital 
itself every night; families were publicly cautioned not to go out of town without 
removing their furniture to upholsterers' warehouses ... the mail was waylaid by 
seven robbers, and the guard shot three dead, and then got shot dead himself 
by the four • . . after which the mail was robbed in peace; that magnificent 
potentate, the Lord Mayor of London, was made to stand and deliver on Turn-
ham Green, by one highwayman, who despoiled the illustrious creature in 
sight of all his retinue ...• In the midst of them, the hangman, ever busy and 
even worse than useless, was in constant requisition; now, stringing up long rows 
of miscellaneous criminals; now, hanging a housebreaker on Saturday who had 
been taken on Tuesday; now, burning people in the hand at Newgate by the 
dozen, and now burning pamphlets at the door of Westminster Hall; today taking 
the life of an atrocious murderer, and tomorrow of a wretched pilferer who had 
robbed a farmer's boy of sixpence. 
C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 3 (Cleartype Ed., n.d.) (emphasis added). 
136. The Genovese case, text accompanying notes 13-20 supra, is an unusual in-
stance of a widespread and intense desire to see a specific crime expiated through 
punishment. The psychology of such a phenomenon is an intriguing subject for spec-
ulation. In the usual case, however, there is no such widespread concern that punish-
ment be meted out. 
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or a sentence for income tax violation seems to do the job; at least 
there is no evidence that people were "better" when hanging was 
more frequent.137 
The allegiance of the bulk of the society is retained with a con-
viction rate that probably accounts for much less than twenty per 
cent of all crimes committed. Allegiance is no more retained by 
abstract evidence of the efficiency of the system than it is by actual 
awareness of the guilty suffering. People may respond to evidence 
of consistent corruption and venality,138 or to what they interpret 
as an intolerable rate of crime, but in neither case is the response 
really occasioned by awareness of a low conviction rate or by having 
been made aware too infrequently of the guilty being punished. 
Venality exposed may shake the faith of some in their duty to obey 
the law. Experiencing or knowing of crime does not even do that; 
rather, it elicits demands for stricter enforcement. This is to be ex-
pected, at least within a fairly wide range, because the technical 
failure of the system does not call into question, as would the moral 
failure, the legitimacy of the system. More efficient enforcement and 
more frequent and publicized punishment probably affects the 
crime rate only through engendering fear. 
Finally, the criminal justice system may increase the predispo-
sition to obey the law among those whom it convicts. In this case, 
of course, we are indirectly improving society not by creating fewer 
criminals, but through the cure of those who have committed crime 
and been convicted. Penology is, therefore, a science with an inher-
ently limited leverage. It can reach, except insofar as a criminal 
culture is self-propagating, only the relatively few who have already 
committed crime and been caught at it. But even at that we are 
speaking with excessive optimism, as if, in fact, penologists know 
how to prevent convicts from committing yet more crimes after 
their release. There is little if any evidence that we have such 
knowledge. 
There is then little reason for the optimistic belief that any 
manipulation of the criminal justice system will have any measur-
able effect upon the belief that the law ought to be obeyed, upon 
our judgments of right and ·wrong, or upon our tendency to commit 
137. See note 133 supra. 
138. See Gardiner, Public Attitudes Toward Gambling and Corruption, 374 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. Sci. 123, 128-34. Gardiner's study of "Wincanton," "an eastern indus-
trial city with a 1960 population between 75,000 and 200,000," id. at 124-25, indicates 
that the public, while complacent toward the crime of gambling, can become suffi-
ciently concerned when corruption is brought blatantly to its attention. But when cor-
ruption is quiet, no one worries about it. 
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crime. And surely this has to be the case. A society cannot be so 
sensitive to the quality of its criminal justice system that its col-
lapse or its continuance would depend upon who was elected sheriff. 
For its preservation a society must develop a wide tolerance for 
variation in the quality and efficiency of enforcement. If this is true, 
it follows that changes in the system will have to be very dramatic 
to affect the basis of social organization-the shared belief in the 
rightness of those prohibitions that make common life possible. 
These arguments have particular force if the crime problem is, 
as it appears in large part to be, the normal criminal activity of an 
abnormally large group of young people. Juvenile crime does not 
usually grow into adult crime, and the juvenile's criminal phase is 
unlikely to last more than five to ten years. For any institutional 
device to influence juvenile crime, it must somehow reach the youth 
during this period of his life or before it. One would surmise that 
the opportunities are very slight for the criminal justice system to 
impress upon the young its fairness, its efficiency, or its vengeance. 
For better or for worse, the moral education of the young is largely 
in other hands, even in the slums. And those who reach teenage ill-
disposed toward the law are likely to get through their criminal 
period without ever having been caught on a charge serious enough 
to expect these results; yet the Commission fails to tell us so. 
I cannot but believe that the commissioners know all this. The 
source of their optimism really has little to do with the systemic 
manipulation to which they devote so much of their attention.140 
Their optimism could reasonably be predicated only upon improve-
ment of the society that the criminal justice system sen'es. But that 
is trickery. Granted that improvement in the society was one of the 
seven contingencies upon which their optimism was founded; the 
truth is that reasoned hope for a significant reduction in crime 
could be based upon this contingency alone, and, absent this, it 
could be based on the realization of no other. 
When it came time to deal with the social order rather than the 
criminal justice system, the Commission was understandably short 
on detailed advice. What it did, in effect, was use the Crime Com-
mission report as another platform to plump for the usual range of 
liberal and Great Society nostrums for social ills. The Commission's 
advice in this area cannot be taken as a serious, independent contri-
139. See note 134 supra on the likelihood of anyone being caught and punished for 
crime. 
140. On the general problems of systematic or constitutional manipulation, see D. 
OAKS & W. LEHMAN, supra note 128, at 175-96 (1968). 
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bution. Its recommendations are but thinly disguised descriptions 
of presumably desirable end-states.141 How one reaches those ends 
the Commission cannot suggest. 
While it is true that no one else knows how to improve the 
society either, it is also true that others positing the same goals 
at least give some recognition to the difficulties of reaching them. 
The Commission can recommend housing improvement without the 
least acknowledgement of sixty years of frustrated effort toward this 
goal. In recommending integration, the Commission ignores the 
fact that the most vociferous voices in the Negro community now 
favor segregation and that many whites have been converted to the 
belief that separate development ought to be the immediate goal.142 
More and better teachers are demanded143 in a report that also asks 
for more and better police,144 and more and better social workers,145 
and, of necessity, more and better lawyers.146 How we are to find all 
of these better people, no one says, nor even who should get first 
choice among them. 
In a word, with respect to what is most necessary the Commission 
offers the least help. Its optimism, if it is founded upon anything, 
is built upon the insecure sands of received liberal welfare doctrine, 
and the problems that stand between our society and that brave 
new world are ignored as if they were but minor nuisances. It is 
not fair to respond that detailed consideration of these issues was 
beyond the scope or competence of the Commission. The Commis-
sion nowhere in its report suggests that its social recommendations 
are any less well-founded than its recommendations for the criminal 
justice system. No more is it an excuse to say that the Commission 
141. E.g., "Expand efforts to improve housing and recreation," "Develop methods 
to provide minimum income," "Develop activities that involve the whole family to-
gether," "Reduce racial and economic segregation." REPORT 293-94. (On the doubtful 
value of economic integration, see Lehman, Thinking Small About Urban Renewal, 
1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 396, 403, 408-10). 
142. See Roberts, Afore Whites Dropping Theory of Integration, Supporting Black 
Power, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 22, 1967, at lB, col. I. 
143. REPORT 73. 
144. REPORT 106-13. 
145. "Social workers" stands here as surrogate for a variety of welfare workers, 
gang workers, family counsellors, psychiatric social workers, employment counsellors, 
settlement house workers, probation officers and so on. The need for these is implicit 
in any number of the recommendations of the juvenile crime chapter, REPORT 55-89, 
the corrections chapter, REPORT 159-85, and in the program suggested for the handling 
of drunkenness offenses. REPORT 233-37. 
146. REPORT 150, 151-53. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURT 152-61 for Lee Sil-
verstein's background paper Manpower Requirements in the Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice. 
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was, after all, dealing with very hard problems.147 Its optimistic 
stance is exactly the source of the objection. Had it made clear the 
difficulty of the problems it would have fulfilled its duty to the 
public. That is exactly what it did not do. 
Perhaps worse than oversimplification is a disquieting omission. 
The recommendations for improvement of the social order, which 
we would like to believe may ultimately reduce crime, are certain 
in the meanwhile to increase it-at least in the form of demonstra-
tion and riot, and probably in juvenile and property crimes as well. 
All our knowledge of revolutionary psychology indicates that the 
propensity to revolt increases with relative improvement in status.148 
There is also evidence that the propensity of juveniles to commit 
property crimes responds to affluence in the same way.149 We have 
to expect these results; yet the Commission fails to tell us so. 
B. When Is a Crime Not a Crime? 
"[T]he criminal law is the formal cause of crime, since a crime 
is merely an instance of behaviour which is prohibited by the 
criminal law .... "150 Obviously, in any state of society the longer 
the list of prohibited behavior the greater will the society's crime 
problem appear to be. The make-up of the list, however, will be 
relevant in determining what a given volume of crime means for 
the health of the society. Insofar as crime statistics during Prohi-
bition included instances of people drinking illegally, one would 
question the admissibility of such statistics as evidence of moral 
decay. On the contrary, one might conclude that classifying drink-
147. This explanation was offered by James Q. Wilson in The Crime Commission 
Reports, THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1967, at 66-67. 
148. If I recall my history correctly, such an explanation was offered for the French 
Revolution. More apposite, however, is a recent study of Negro riots in America. From 
the income, quality of education, intensity of contact with whites of Negro college 
students who participated in sit-ins, John M. Orbell has concluded that "the cause of 
the [Negro) revolution is the increasing proximity of Negroes to the dominant white 
culture-the closer Negroes come, the more strongly they demand their share." 
Roundup of Current Research, TRANS-ACTION, Oct. 1967, at 4. William Styron puts 
the following words into the mouth of Nat Turner, the leader of an 1831 slave revolt: 
"Does it seem a hopeless paradox that the less toilsome became the circumstances of 
my life the more I hoped to escape it? That the more tolerable and human white 
people became in their dealings with me, the keener was my passion to destroy them?" 
(Quoted in Platt, Review, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1968, at 14, 15). Orbell did not 
find, however, that increasing contact with whites produced increased animosity. 
149. See Toby, Affiuence and Adolescent Crime, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE!'ORT: JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 134 (1968). 
150. J. MICHAEL&: M. ADLER, CRIM1i:, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 20 (1932). 
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ing as a crime had exaggerated the crime problem. But I do not 
intend primarily to consider whether "overcriminalization"151-the 
use of criminal sanctions in inappropriate situations-results in 
exaggeration. Rather, I intend to look at some social problems 
raised by unquestioning enforcement of the substance of today's 
criminal law. 
What behavior can appropriately be called criminal has recently 
generated a fair amount of discussion. Unfortunately, most of the 
discussion, at least in this country, has been directed to academic 
audiences.152 The Commission had the opportunity to increase par-
ticipation in the debate, but instead, it approached the topic so 
gingerly that a reader who was not already familiar with the terms 
of the debate could not understand what the Commission was say-
ing. At the level of the final report, the Commission considered 
decriminalization as a possibility only in relation to marijuana-
smoking and public drunkenness.153 Professor Sanford Kadish, serv-
ing as a Commission consultant, tried to get the Commission to 
consider whether we should legalize gambling, abortion, narcotics, 
and deviant and extra-marital sexual relations. The substance of his 
paper is now available in the Annals of the American Academy of 
Political Science.154 It is a strong and forthright piece that could 
have been readily adapted to bring to a wide audience the issues 
involved. A chapter in Task Force Report: The Courts was based 
upon Professor Kadish's paper.155 Of this chapter, Professor Kadish 
says, "[T]he controversial character of [the] issues, and the need to 
achieve consensus ... quite understandably required some reduc-
151. The term, as handy as it is barbaric, is apparently accepted in the trade, Ka-
dish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 .ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF PoL. Sci. 157 
(1967). 
152. E.g., DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959); GREAT BRITAIN COMMITIEE 
ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT, COMMAND No. 247 (1957) (The 
Wolfenden Report); H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); Kadish, supra note 
151; Schelling, Economics and Criminal Enterprise, THE Ptm. INTEREST, Spring 1967, at 
61. The 'Wolfenden Report demonstrates that government commissions need not avoid 
touchy subjects, at least in England. Such a report must also have resulted in bringing 
to a wider audience in England the question of reducing restrictions on private sexual 
activities. 
153. In respect of marijuana it recommended only study of the issue. REPORT 224-
25. Presumably by way of compensation for this daring suggestion, the Commission in 
respect to all other drugs generally followed the hard line of the Federal Narcotics 
Bureau. REPORT 219-21. In respect of drunkenness it expressly recommended "de-
criminalization." REPORT 236. There is a brief but not at all pointed discussion of the 
enforcement of morality at REPORT 126-27. 
154. See note 151 supra. 
155. Substantive Law Reform and the Limits of Effective Law Enforcement, PRESI• 
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINisrRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REPORT: THE COURTS 97-107 (1967). 
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tion in scope and muting in tone .... "156 But even the muted task 
force report is not the Commission report. When the subject was 
strained once again by the Commission, it was reduced to a single 
page in which the issues are not only muted but virtually invis-
ible.157 Of course, the Commission makes no recommendation. For 
all practical purposes, the Commission worked on the assumption 
that the criminal law ought to be taken and enforced as found. 
I. Classifying Crimes 
In questioning whether or not behavior should be classified as 
criminal, "[t]hinking of 'crime' as a whole is futile,"168 unless one 
is content to deal on an ad hoc basis. The Commission, however, 
provides no general guides for thinking about crime in useful cate-
gories: "The causes of crime, then, are numerous and mysterious 
and intertwined. . . . No one way of describing crime describes it 
well enough."159 Doubtless true. It is, however, equally true that 
without at least some categories, imprecise though they may be, it 
is impossible to look at crime except as a whole. 
I venture, therefore, some rough and overlapping categories to 
aid in thinking about the subject. The criterion chosen is the man-
ner in which the individual who violates the law views his own 
behavior-whether he thinks it is appropriate behavior for all mem-
bers of society. I intentionally avoid asking whether the law ought to 
enforce morality, because the terms of that debate can be misleading. 
While it is true that the law is not co-extensive with morality, it is 
equally true that the core of that which is called criminal must be 
felt to be immoral. The question as a practical matter is which 
moral judgments the law ought to enforce and which ones it ought 
to leave alone. One possible answer is that proscription is, in terms 
of the legitimacy of the law, safe in proportion as those who commit 
the proscribed behavior concede its impropriety and, but for special 
justification, avoid it.160 It is obvious that the views of the delin-
quents toward various proscribed behavior would form something 
156. Kadish, supra note 151, at 158. Though Professor Kadish was quite polite 
about it, it seems reasonable to believe that he was rather piqued at having that chap-
ter attributed to him [PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 2 (1967)] when it reflected only a 
muted version of his paper. It would appear that his article, supra note 151, provided 
him an occasion for setting the record straight. 
157. REPORT 126-27. 
158. REPORT 3. 
159. REPORT 18. 
160. This answer, it must be noted, does not tell what should be proscribed, but 
only what can be without a range of deleterious consequences. 
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like a continuum. For purposes of analysis, however, we can con-
struct models at each end and at the middle of that continuum. 
There are, first of all, acts like rape, murder, and robbery which 
almost everyone outside of the criminal community views as im-
proper. Even the criminal, if he has otherwise rationalized his be-
havior, may view such acts as improper in most circumstances. These 
are acts, in other words, which virtually no one would assert should 
form the basis of a categorical imperative. As long as these acts are 
committed for what the actor sees as idiosyncratic reasons, we are 
dealing ·with what might be called "ordinary" or recognized crime.161 
The legitimacy of the law is not likely to be called into question by 
even the most stringent enforcement of laws prohibiting ordinary 
crime. 
A second class of criminal behavior includes a range of activities 
about which the society as a whole is, and its members as individuals 
are likely to be, ambivalent-behavior that the society hopes to min-
imize and keep out of sight, but which no one expects to eliminate 
completely. Prostitution is the classic example, but probably most 
consensual crimes-crimes without victims-have fallen at one time 
or another into this category. In respect to each of these crimes one 
must ask whether the costs of suppression exceed the advantages of 
prohibition. Abortion is an obvious case. Making abortion criminal 
probably results in many needless deaths among the customers of 
shady medical practitioners-deaths that would be avoided were it 
possible to obtain an abortion in a hospital. It was costs such as this 
that Sanford Kadish wanted the Commission to bring to the public's 
attention. 
In the third class of crime there is a denial by the perpetrator of 
any impropriety. Actually two subclasses are recognizable. The first 
involves acts which are considered by some not to be inherently im-
moral; the perpetrators consider their behavior consistent with a 
categorical imperative. The rule can be stated either in negative or 
positive terms: in respect to no one should this act carry opprobrium 
or criminal sanction, or, everyone should engage in similar actions. 
We can call these moral crimes.162 Obvious contemporary examples 
161. The term "ordinary criminal acts" is used by Dean Francis Allen in Civil Dis-
obedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1967). 
162. For most homosexuals, homosexuality is probably closer to a moral crime than 
to an ordinary consensual crime. Those who engage prostitutes (and perhaps prosti-
tutes themselves) probably view their behaviour more often as ordinary (consensual) 
crime. Drug use is probably in process of change from ordinary to moral crime, at 
least with respect to "soft" narcotics and hallucinogens. The difference is important 
for the legitimacy of the specific prohibition involved and can be significant for the 
legitimacy of the whole system. 
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include homosexual behavior and the use of narcotic drugs. In both 
instances guilt feelings have been suppressed, the behavior is engaged 
in, and assertions are commonly made that it should not be illegal. 
The second subclass includes a miscellany of usually minor crimes 
engaged in as a means of expressing discontent with the social order. 
We can call these acts protest crimes. The specific forms of criminal 
behavior engaged in are probably not thought by the perpetrators to 
be consistent with a categorical imperative. Persons who, for instance, 
make private property unusable by "sitting-in" probably would not 
want a society in which it was impossible to protect generally against 
invasions of private property.163 But they may believe that people 
who are confronted with a perceived evil are bound by a categorical 
imperative to express their concern through violation of laws they 
would normally respect. 
2. Moral and Protest Crime 
The impression that there is a crime crisis is doubtless heightened 
by the publicity given to moral crimes and crimes of protest.164 These 
crimes attract attention and induce abhorrence. They do so because 
their commission either questions the most basic values that guide 
the lives of the majority or threatens a comfortable, convenient, and 
familiar social order.165 The observer's abhorrence is readily trans-
lated into a perceived moral decay in the observed. Moral decay, un-
Americanism, and like terms are convenient dumping grounds for 
163. While this position may be adopted formally by demonstrators, there is evi-
dence that lawbreaking is contagious. See Allen, supra note 161, at 30-37 (1967). 
164. Despite the relative insignificance of the harm they cause. See id. at 19: 
The harms to persons and threats to public order than can in any fair way be 
traced directly to the activities of modern protest groups shrink into insignificance 
when compared with those associated with murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, bur-
glaries, and larcenies that for generations have disfigured life in our cities. 
This statement may seem too strong after the Newark and Detroit riots but probably 
is not. 
Because my purpose is different from Dean Allen's, I lump together here civil dis-
obedience (which is of its nature public, see id. at 9) and, for instance, deviant sexual 
behavior when engaged in by those who believe it should not be illegal (such behav-
ior is likely to be engaged in in private). Secret law violations considered morally 
justified may not cause such obvious disruption as has been attributed to civil disobe-
dience, supra note 163, but the difference is of degree, not kind. 
165. Dean Allen, id. at 21-24, discusses the difference in public reaction to ordinary 
and sociopolitical crime. Recognizing the latter to be considerably more disturbing to 
the public, he attributes the stronger reaction at least in part to the fact that socio-
political crime constitutes "a fundamental challenge to the sovereignty of law." Id. at 
24. It strikes me as unlikely that the disturbed among the public see the problem in 
such abstract terms. It is possible to draw this inference insofar as the law embodies an 
acceptable moral code and supports a familiar social organization. But I think it not 
the threat to law but the threat to what the law embodies that gives rise to the con-
cern. 
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all that we perceive and do not like. Only with the guidance of in-
formed discussion will the public learn to distinguish betwen rape 
and the use of mari ju;ma, or between mugging and protesting. But 
making such distinction is necessary not only properly to inform the 
public, but also to provide a sound basis for policy. 
In a sense, it is improper to describe moral and protest crimes as 
crime at all. Those engaging in the proscribed behavior, and often 
many observers as well, will deny the presence of immorality that is 
the basis of ordinary crime. When organized or self-conscious groups 
take this position on many issues or with any frequency the commu-
nity is faced, no matter how it chooses to view the situation, with 
something different from an ordinary crime problem. On a purely 
pragmatic level, it is quickly discovered that suppression of moral 
and protest crime is peculiarly ineffective. Instead of inducing fright, 
suppression raises martyrs. Instead of discouraging repetition, it en-
courages it. The observer may choose to defend his shaky moral 
superiority, to continue to insist on the decadence of the revolution-
aries, but if he is to fight with any hope of success, he must take a 
careful and objective measure of the enemy. 
It is not self-evident that the legal order ought to enforce the 
criminal law in dealing with moral and protest crime.166 The legal 
order might better look to its mm self-preservation. The criminal 
law can be called upon to perform at least two intellectually distin-
guishable functions, which we can call social and political. In con-
trasting these functions, the issues will become clear. 
On the one hand, the legal system can enforce, and thereby rein-
force, the basic norms shared by all members of the society. It can, 
in a word, enforce the ordinary criminal law. In doing so, the legal 
system acts as an integral element of the social structure; probably, 
because common to all societies, it is an element necessary to hold 
societies together. When the substantive criminal law is limited 
to prohibitions against ordinary crime, the legal system is performing 
a purely social function. 
The substantive criminal law probably never corresponds com-
pletely to the moral sense of the community. Through discretionary 
enforcement, legal fictions, and so on, disparities can be tolerated. 
166. I depart again from Dean Allen on this point. See id. at 14. I imagine I de-
part from many others, as well. However, it should be emphasized to make clear the 
limits of the disagreement that I am addressing myself to law enforcement agencies 
rather than to those engaged in or considering civil disobedience. That I might offer 
to enforcing agencies this year the advice that follows does not mean I would not offer 
to Dean Allen's audience much the same advice he so articulately and persuasively 
offers. 
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But when a majority and minority coagulate into recognizable 
groups, so that the criminal law is seen by the victims as a device for 
imposing the will of one upon the other, then the criminal law be-
comes a political tool. At least three consequ-ences follow: the law as 
a general organizing institution is discredited in the the eyes of the 
suppressed; the law becomes tied to the political fortunes of the 
majority, whose tool it has become; and enforcement, because nor-
mal levels of effort are inadequate, must be stepped up dramatically 
to produce a tolerable conformity to law. 
In performing its social function, law enforcement, without seri-
ously affecting the amount of crime in the community, can be ex-
tremely inefficient in putting criminals behind bars.167 Consensus 
on proper social behavior performs the basic job of protecting the 
society from disruption. When consensus collapses or a majority 
attempts to use the criminal law to enforce its policy judgments, how-
ever, consensus cannot come to the aid of the criminal justice system, 
and it is on its own in the fight against the minority. Consequently, 
it m,ust try to achieve a much higher rate of success in apprehension 
and conviction. Of necessity, it must turn to techniques appropriate 
in a totalitarian state. When the criminal law does so, its claim to 
provide the ordering basis of the society is yet further weakened: not 
only is it called upon to enforce unacceptable laws, but it is com-
pelled to use unacceptable techniques in doing so. 
Enforcing the will of the majority is exactly the position that the 
criminal law should avoid. When the legal order is put in that posi-
tion it may justly question, in the interest of self-preservation, its duty 
to enforce the law. The continued vitality of the system may then de-
pend upon its not attempting the degree of enforcement attempted 
in respect of crimes proper; it must know when to give in and when 
to overlook. (When enforcing laws against ordinary crimes, it need 
never do so, though for reasons unrelated to the legitimacy of the 
system it may choose to do so.) 
As a practical matter, such discretion is not likely to be en-
countered once issues become polarized. The police are unlikely to 
respond with tolerance to an implied threat. (The Detroit riot of 
1967 was triggered by a police raid on an after-hours tavern-a blind 
pig. One may ask whether the police would have overlooked the 
violation had they been explicitly threatened, as a response, with the 
possibility of a riot. It seems unlikely. Yet it is perfectly conceivable 
167. See note 134 and text accompanying notes 134-37. 
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that many policemen-even those not paid off-would have chosen 
to wink at a liquor law violation.) Even were the police inclined to 
temporize, if their decisions were visible the possibility of criticism 
would probably discourage them. Differential enforcement cannot 
easily be indulged as a public or even a conscious policy, and no 
verbal justification for such a decision is likely to be found satisfac-
tory. The only thing that makes discretionary negative charging de-
cisions possible is their invisibility. 
Nonetheless, discretionary enforcement is not to be condemned 
out of hand in cases of moral or political crime; there is no corre-
sponding universal disapproval of discretion in enforcement with 
respect to other minor crimes. There is no reason why discretion 
should not be indulged in appropriate circumstances to avoid greater 
evils, as long as it is done quietly. But except for such occasional 
exercise of political judgment in essentially political matters, there 
is little that the criminal justice system can do that is not simply 
defensive. The problem of accommodating to changing morality and 
of minimizing the destruction, disorganization, and injury that may 
result from political crime does not rest comfortably in the hands of 
the criminal justice administration. The real problems are political 
and social and must ultimately be resolved by other means. The crim-
inal justice system can only do its best at holding down the fort until 
assistance arrives from the legislature or until a new consensus 
develops. 
In neglecting to point out these problems, the Commission again 
failed to help the community think about crime. At the same time, 
it garnered for its crisis theory whatever support was to be found in 
public concern with moral and protest crime. In taking advantage 
of this public concern as an occasion to increase the effectiveness of 
law enforcement, it may be that the Commission will have speeded 
revolution rather than stayed it. 
3. Is Gambling a Sin? 
It is the consensual crimes that have raised the question whether 
the law ought to be used to enforce morality.168 Because the wisdom 
of the laws against a whole range of consensual crimes has been can-
vassed in two recent and excellent articles,169 I shall not attempt 
another survey. I want to emphasize only one particularly glaring 
168. See the sources cited in note 152 supra. 
169. Kadish, supra note 151; Schelling, supra note 152. 
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example of the Commission's refusal to question the substantive 
definitions of the criminal law: its refusal seriously to ask whether 
gambling ought to be legalized. 
Faced with a similar issue, the Wickersham Commission, though 
it could not bring itself to recommend repeal of the eighteenth 
amendment, at least asked honestly whether Prohibition was a good 
thing. In doing so, it doubtless aided public understanding of the 
issue. Had the current President's Commission asked the same ques-
tions with respect to gambling-even concluding that gambling 
should still be prohibited-it would have performed a corresponding 
service to the America of this decade. That it failed to do so, in the 
face of two facts, is a woeful comment on the Commission. 
The first fact is made clear by the Commission's mvn assertion: 
gambling is, as alcohol was forty years ago, the rock upon which 
organized crime is built. The Commission had before it-indeed, it 
gives us-the salient facts.170 The take from gambling each year is 
seven billion dollars. Second to gambling, the two most lucrative 
black market activites are loan sharking and the sale of narcotics, and 
the income from gambling is twenty times that of either of the run-
ners-up. Gambling accounts for eighty per cent of all income from 
supplying illegal goods and services. Perhaps more striking is the fact 
that if you add up all of the costs of crime-including not only crimi-
nal income but the costs of the police and the court system, of insur-
ance and legal fees, of earnings lost by the victims of violent crime, 
of private protection services-gambling accounts for a third of the 
the cost of crime in the United States. The income from gambling 
each year is two and one-half times the total cost of running all of 
the nation's police forces. By defining this industry as criminal we 
take its vast income from the hands of government and legitimate 
business and deposit it in the hands of the syndicate. There it will be 
put out at profit by loan sharks, used to finance the infiltration of 
criminals into legitimate business, and invested in the corruption of 
the police. What are the social gains to counterbalance such costs? 
It is hard to believe the Commission missed the implications that 
were so plain in its own statistics. (On the bar graph illustrating the 
cost of crime, the bar representing gambling was too long to fit on 
the page.)171 One might forgive, if not condone, this lapse if the 
Commission had any reason to fear that the public would disapprove 
the mere mention of the possibility. But the second disturbing fact 
170. The figures that follow are read or interpolated from the chart in REPORT 33. 
Statements in the text, REPORT 32, cannot be directly correlated with the chart. 
171. See REPORT 33. 
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is that in this time of affluence it seems unlikely that any strong voice 
would have assailed the White House had the Commission asked the 
question. Gambling, unlike homosexuality or the sale or use of 
narcotics, is not considered a sign of depravity by any significant 
element of the population.172 One could have hoped that a sympa-
thetic understanding of the plight of the homosexual and the addict 
would have stiffened the Commission's backbone and led it to face 
those problems, regardless of the possible hue and cry. No such 
moral support would have been needed to ask, with respect to gam-
bling, whether we should continue its prohibition. 
Why, then, did the Commission not do so? The kindest explana-
tion is that commissions, like regulatory agencies and legislatures, 
share with courts the problem of detecting or being moved to respond 
to diffuse public interests.173 With gambling there are no squeaky 
wheels, no obviously localized public costs, no touching victims. No 
one has any serious difficulty placing a bet, hence there is no strong 
movement by frustrated consumers. The syndicate has, through or-
ganization, internalized external costs, with the result that there is 
little bloodshed.174 There are, as far as one can tell by the paper, 
fewer people led to financial ruin by gambling than are led there by 
the hire-purchase plan. Who is to complain that gambling is illegal? 
Surely not the syndicate. 
Less charitably, it has been suggested that the Commission failed 
to ask the question because of its dependence on enforcement agen-
cies, which have "(to put it mildly) a vested Parkinsonian interest 
in perpetuating criminal definitions of the conduct they are called 
upon to regulate."175 It has been argued that the Commission wanted 
the agencies of criminal justice to participate wholeheartedly in 
their own Commission-recommended reform; and that to win co-
operation the Commission, besides accepting existing definitions of 
crime, hid its eyes from police corruption,176 included in its recom-
mendations a great deal of money for enforcement agencies,177 and 
172. John A. Gardiner in his study of Wincanton found that 88% of those inter-
viewed thought bingo should be permitted, 59% favored a state lottery, and 55% 
favored legalizing all gambling. Gardner, supra note 138, at 126. 
173. On the courts, see, e.g., Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 383, 403-04 (1908). On regulatory agencies, see, e.g., Note, The Law of Adminis-
trative Standing and the Public Right of Intervention, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 416. 
174. See Schelling, supra note 152, at 65-66. 
175. Silver, Crime, American Style: The President's Commission, COMMONWEAL, 
April 21, 1967, at 141. 
176. Id. at 142. The reference following the index entry "Police corruption" reads 
"see police misconduct." REPORT 336. 
177. MacKenzie, The Compromise Report on Crime, NEW REPUBuc, Feb. 4, 1967, 
at 15, 16. 
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larded its report "with encomiums to such agencies as the FBI and 
the Narcotics Bureau."178 
Whatever the reason, the Commission missed an opportunity to 
call attention to a question the public ought to be asked to consider 
in an informed way. With its vast prestige, the Commission could 
have prepared the way for a genuine revolution, one which would 
have significantly reduced crime and given law enforcement agencies 
a fighting chance against an enemy that can now buy and sell them. 
The idea is simple enough: legitimate competition will in time re-
place criminal organization in supplying such services as gambling 
if and when the supplying of such services becomes a legitimate busi-
ness in which others can enter. I know this thesis to be questioned. 
There is, however, ample evidence of its truth. I cite three examples. 
The most obvious, perhaps therefore the most likely to be over-
looked, is that traffic in liquor, once the mainstay of organized crime, 
is now a trivial part of criminal business-illicit liquor costs about 
seventy-five cents per person per year in the United States while 
gambling costs thirty-five dollars per person.179 In another field, 
the syndicate in New York is selling out its interest in homosexual 
bars because legitimate businessmen are, as a result of reduced police 
pressure, entering the market in competition with organized crime.180 
Perhaps more apposite, gambling in Nevada, thought to have been 
run by the syndicate even though legalized, is even now being taken 
over by legitimate business. The erratic Howard Hughes has been 
buying about everything in sight in Nevada, including a number of 
casinos. More important, since passage of a law permitting corpora-
tions to own casinos, 181 other legitimate corporations have been go-
ing into the gambling business.182 Certainly this will mean a dramatic 
reduction in organized "skimming," with the result that the govern-
178. Silver, supra note 175, at 141. 
179. Figures extrapolated from the table in REPORT 33. 
180. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1967, at 10-I, col. 1: 
A more tolerant attitude by police and the liquor authority towards bars that 
cater to homosexuals-plus an increasing social tolerance of deviates-has induced 
legitimate businessmen to invest in such places. This has broken the near monop-
oly enjoyed for years by Mafia. 
181. 5 AUTOMATED STAT. REP. 98, Nev. Stat. 470-77 (1967), amending NEV. R.Ev. STAT. 
463.170 (1967). 
182. See Starr, Why Is Howard Hughes Buying Up Las Vegas?, LooK, Jan. 23, 1968, 
69, 73: 
Governor Laxalt is a number one fan of Hughes: "His coming here did things for 
our state image that a multimillion-dollar public relations campaign couldn't 
have achieved," says the Governor. He has given Nevada gambling instant 
respectability. The Governor wants out-of-staters to take notice that Nevada has 
for several years been making a shift from the old methods of financing 
gambling casinos through an assemblage of partners to the corporate way, 
with open bookkeeping and open methods. The Del E. Webb Corp., a Phoe-
nix construction company, has moved into Nevada gaming, and so have several 
other corporations. Last spring, the Nevada legislature made it possible for the 
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ment will get more taxes. Almost certainly it will mean that gam-
bling income will not be used for criminal purposes or be shipped 
outside the United States; rather, it will be reinvested in legitimate 
business. 
"Decriminalization" is, unlike other methods previously men-
tioned, a crime-fighting technique with very considerable leverage. 
The result is not simply that gambling is no longer a crime, so no 
longer included in criminal statistics. Eliminating the need for police 
protection will eliminate the need to corrupt the police. Petty gam-
blers and small-time bookmakers will no longer be so readily subject 
to extortion. And the time of the criminal justice system previously 
devoted to dealing with gaming offenses can be devoted to fighting 
other more serious criminal activity. The salutory influences of 
legalization multiply rather than dwindle. 
The trouble with the Crime Commission's program is not that it 
was unable to answer hard problems. Reducing crime is not easy. 
The trouble with the Crime Commission is that it directed our atten-
tion to the less fruitful among the possibilities for action open to us, 
that it dug over familiar ground rather than put its prestige on the 
line. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I mentioned to a friend in law teaching that I had in progress a 
criticism of the Crime Commission report. He said I must be taking 
it far too seriously. I assume his position was that of the authors of 
the Iron lifountain Report: that there are, as distinct from serious 
studies, "conventional 'showcase' projects organized to demonstrate 
a political leadership's concern about an issue,"183 and that the Crime 
Commission report was one of the latter. 
I cannot believe that it was not intended, at least by the majority 
of those involved, to be taken seriously. I know or know of and re-
spect too many of those who participated in preparing the Commis-
sion report. I£ I ask whether those several hundred people would 
readily give up as much as eighteen months of their lives to partici-
first time for a corporation, and not just individuals, to get a license to run a ca-
sino. 
Federal authorities concerned over crime-syndicate influence in Nevada gam-
bling, cautiously share Laxalt's optimism. "Vve can see a change already," says a 
top U.S. enforcement official. "A number of old-timers are still around, but in-
creasingly, untainted investment money is being attracted here." It is noteworthy 
that after Hughes took over the casinos, employees had to fill out personnel ques-
tionnaires, while thorough investigations were made of key people. 
183. L. LEWIN, REPORT FROM !RON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY 
OF PEACE xiii (1967). 
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pate in a public relations gimmick, the answer has to be no. It would 
be an insult not to take these people seriously.184 
The consultants, the advisors, and the staff, as far as I know, 
could have been consultants, advisors, and staff to a group producing 
a thoroughly creditable report. Perhaps even the commissioners, or 
people of the same sort, but in different mix or under different 
auspices, could have produced a creditable report. But it could not 
be done in the turgid, perfumed air of the capital. Everything con-
spires against good results-the pressure of time, the influence of the 
Administration, and not only the human failings of the participants 
but their virtues as well. 
The President wanted not so much to deal with crime as to deal 
with public concern about crime. The commissioners came to Wash-
ington expecting to deal with the former; they left having dealt 
with the latter. In the process of transformation, the commissioners 
became parties to the most insulting of political views toward the 
public: that the public, like a woman, is to be coddled and courted 
but not taken seriously. They exuded optimism, rode roughshod 
over legitimate controversy, and hid from the public the ideas they 
thought unpalatable. 
The reasons are many for being disturbed about the Crime Com-
mission report. I have limited myself to the more general ones 
because these are the easier to overlook. One's sympathy with specific 
recommendations can easily distract attention from the radical 
failure of the report. And it was a radical failure, almost certain to do 
more harm than good. When everything we know presages increases 
in crime, the Commission's unrealistic optimism, its groundless 
promises of success in the war against crime, are just more mud on 
the face of a distrusted liberalism. The Johnson Administration 
probably will not suffer; as long as the Viet Nam war lasts, no signifi-
cant effort will be made to follow up the Commission's recommenda-
tions; and only when the time and money have been invested will the 
futility of the effort be recognized. The problem of dealing with a 
public that discovers it has been duped will be left to a future 
President. But the reckoning will come for today's politicians or 
their heirs, just as, unfortunately, it will for the cause of liberalism. 
The young will no longer accept well-intended busy-work as a sub-
stitute for success or honest pessimism. 
184. And certainly the report has been taken seriously. The American Academy of 
Political Science devoted its November 1967 issue of the Annals to the Commission re-
port. It is being reviewed by everybody. The American Bar Association has committed 
itself to realization of the Commission's program. 
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But the Commission's program, if Daniel Moynihan is to be 
believed, 185 is just one more nail in the coffin being prepared for 
liberalism by the New Left. The Commission's more unique contri-
bution must lie in what it has done for or to the crime problem. It 
directs us with a free hand to undertake hundreds of activities with 
which to while away our time and whittle at our energies and 
resources. Since the Commission provided no basis for judging which 
activities should be undertaken first, one must predict which recom-
mendations are most likely to lead to action on the basis of impor-
tance or logical priority. There will be widespread support for police 
getting college degrees-a key proposal of the police section,186 which 
James Q. Wilson aptly characterized as nonsense.187 The court system 
will get rid of drunk and disorderly cases before other institutions 
adequate to handle them are developed.188 Despite our best inten-
tions, people will be held for drunkenness (perhaps through some 
form of commitment) for indefinite periods of drying out without 
actually being cured. And in due time we will have our analog to 
Gault.189 Because the Commission feared to ask whether morals 
should be legislated, we will have wiretapping and bugging as the 
only means of fighting the monster created by Prohibition and nur-
tured by the monopoly of gaming. Police commissioners will spend 
their time on, or trying to establish their right to be on, city planning 
commissions.190 Police lobbyists will haunt the halls of Congress 
seeking expanded federal aid. Magistrates and police court judges 
will be sitting on criminal court benches; and the repute of the judi-
ciary, if not the status of those composing it, will sink to unheard of 
lows.191 The business of the misdemeanor courts will be brought to 
felony courts and will bring with it all the evils of ovenvork from 
which felony courts are now largely protected. In a word, the Com-
185. Nirvana Now, 36 THE AM. SCHOLAR 539 (1967). 
186. REPORT 109. 
187. The Crime Commission Reports, THE Pun. INTEREST, Fall 1967, at 64, 81. 
188. The recommendations are made in REPORT 233-37. 
189. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Some form of holding will almost certainly be 
demanded and likely permitted. The Commission itself recommends detention while 
under the influence. REPORT 235. Experience with mental institutions indicates many 
professionals are unhappy wtih voluntary commitment because at crisis periods in 
treatment the patient can choose to walk away, wasting all the investment of treat-
ment resources in him. The commitment approach has also been adopted, despite the 
Commission's neutral stand in dealing with federal narcotics cases. See note 92 supra. 
190. See REPORT 99. 
191. Both these results may be expected as the most likely consequences of unifica• 
tion of misdemeanor and felony courts, recommended by the Commission in REPORT 
129. 
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mission's recommendations will be carried out in exact proportion 
as there are those who have something to gain from their achieve-
ment. The rest will languish for want of interested proponents. And 
the pursuit of self-interest has the Commission's implied approval. 
Indeed, its tactic was to appeal to self-interest-a little bit for every-
body-in the predictably vain hope that the things nobody is in-
terested in will be carried along in the tide. 
Worst of all, the Commission has probably pre-empted for many 
years the field of major reassessment of the crime problem. The 
Commission was called into being because people were concerned 
about crime. It was to substitute for Goldwater's simple answers 
some real ones. It was to tell the people of America how to think 
about crime and what to do about it. To this task it brought the 
prestige of the White House and of its own members. That it 
frittered away the corpus of its trust means not only an opportunity 
missed but an opportunity foreclosed for others. Where are the 
authors to be found? Where the interest and enthusiasm? Having 
pre-empted the field, this inadequate report must be our guide 
through the years of increasing crime. I think it better we had none. 
The vacuum might have raised up a better one. 
